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Abstract
In 2015 more than 150 million records and $400 billion were lost due to publicly-
reported criminal and nation-state cyberattacks in the United States alone. The failure
of our existing security infrastructure motivates the need for improved technologies,
and cryptography provides a powerful tool for doing this. There is a misperception that
the cryptography we use today is a “solved problem” and the real security weaknesses
are in software or other areas of the system. This is, in fact, not true at all, and
over the past several years we have seen a number of serious vulnerabilities in the
cryptographic pieces of systems, some with large consequences.
This thesis will discuss three aspects of securing deployed cryptographic systems.
We will first explore the evaluation of systems in the wild, using the example of how
to efficiently and effectively recover user passwords submitted over TLS encrypted
with RC4, with applications to many methods of web authentication as well as the
popular IMAP protocol for email. We will then address my work on developing
tools to design and create cryptographic systems and bridge the often large gap
between theory and practice by introducing AutoGroup+, a tool that automatically
ii
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translates cryptographic schemes from the mathematical setting used in the literature
to that typically used in practice, giving both a secure and optimal output. We will
conclude with an exploration of how to actually build real world deployable systems
by discussing my work on developing decentralized anonymous credentials in order to
increase the security and deployability of existing anonymous credentials systems.
Primary Reader: Matthew Green
Secondary Readers: Aviel Rubin and Nadia Heninger
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In 2015 more than 150 million records and $400 billion were lost due to publicly-
reported criminal and nation-state cyberattacks in the United States alone [1, 2].
The failure of our existing security infrastructure motivates the need for improved
technologies. Cryptography provides a powerful tool for doing this. There is a
misperception that the cryptography we use today is a “solved problem” and the real
security weaknesses are in software or other areas of the system. This is, in fact, not
true at all. Over the past several years we have seen a number of serious vulnerabilities
in the cryptographic pieces of systems, some with large consequences [3, 4, 5, 6]. These




One of the unique aspects of applied cryptography as a research field is that it
is driven by practice, including security needs and goals and even attacks on real
systems. My work has focused on the security of deployed cryptographic systems in all
of its aspects, including the evaluation of real systems, developing improved tools to
design and create those systems, and actually creating real, deployable systems. Each
of these components is critical to achieving real world, secure cryptographic systems.
Analyzing and evaluating real systems is often the best method that we currently have
to determine if they are secure. Many of the errors that we find when analyzing these
systems could have been prevented if designers and software engineers had better
tools. And experience with developing and deploying real world systems is crucial to
understanding the tooling needed to best help others and where the weakpoints are in
the process. Understanding and working in each area provides you with the overall
picture needed to be most effective in the field of applied cryptography.
This thesis will focus on work from each of the three areas, highlighting my
experiences in the complete picture of applied cryptography research. I now describe




1.1.1 Evaluating, Attacking, and Securing Existing
Cryptographic Protocols
Cryptographic attacks are an important part of cryptographic development, testing,
and security and often are the only way to truly demonstrate problems with already
deployed systems. It is a community truism that “attacks only get better,” but this is
often insufficient to motivate vendors to fix existing schemes. We have often seen that
so-called “theoretical” attacks are not taken seriously until researchers demonstrate
that something is actually broken. It is important that these attacks be done in the
labs by researchers where things can then be patched, instead of happening in the
wild where they can compromise user security.
Despite many recent high-profile attacks on the RC4 encryption algorithm and
many recommendations from experts to cease using it, in 2015 approximately 30%
of all TLS traffic, including web browsing and email, was encrypted using RC4. Our
research took the position that the only way to change industry adoption of RC4
was to demonstrate and deploy practical attacks against real systems that used the
algorithm. To develop such a practical attack, we focused on recovering user passwords
submitted over TLS encrypted with RC4. We were able to effectively and efficiently
recover passwords by carefully exploiting statistical biases in the pseudorandom output
of the generator and tailoring our attack to passwords. This has potential implications
for many methods of web authentication as well as the popular IMAP protocol for
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email. Demonstrating a believable, practical attack forced a change in the community
and a recognition that RC4 was well and truly broken.
This sort of work can have demonstrable real world impact both within the
community and for the general public. RC4 has now been removed from all major
web browsers [7] and prohibited by the IETF in all TLS implementations [8].
1.1.2 Tools for Developing Secure Cryptographic Sys-
tems
The second part of my research deals with developing tools that can make it easier
for both experts and non-experts to develop secure cryptographic systems. As we
have seen repeatedly, developing secure cryptographic systems is hard. Whether it
is difficulties in translating schemes developed by researchers to code, mistakes in
implementation, or poor optimizations, we are often able to find flaws in deployed
systems. Cryptographic automation is a new and promising area that is designed
to help solve many of these problems and make developing secure systems easier
and less error-prone. This approach has already shown promise. Various tools exist
to help cryptographers create security proofs in an automated, computer-assisted
manner [9, 10], while other lines of research help automate the creation of new
cryptographic schemes [11, 12].
Pairing-based cryptography has become very popular over the last decade, as
4
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this algebraic setting offers good functionality and efficiency. It is used in many
popular cryptographic schemes, such as Identity-Based Encryption [13] and Attribute-
Based Encryption [14], and pairing-commercializer Voltage Security was acquired by
a major US company (HP) [15]. However, there is a huge security gap between how
schemes are usually analyzed in the academic literature and how they are typically
implemented. To address this, our contribution was the design, development and
evaluation of a new software tool, AutoGroup+, that automatically translates from
the mathematical setting used in the literature to that typically used in practice.
The output of AutoGroup+ is secure and optimal based on the user’s efficiency
constraints [16]. AutoGroup+ is able to take a cryptographic scheme written in a
special language, similar to LATEX, as input and then output both C and Python code
of the transformed scheme.
This sort of tool can be extremely valuable for both experts and non-experts.
Experts can use it to check their results or reduce manual (often error-prone) work. Non-
experts can use it to translate schemes from research into practical, useable schemes
for their systems, without having to attempt to do the translation or implementation




1.1.3 New Domains for Cryptographic Applications
Because cryptography is so ubiquitous in the world today, the ability to actually
develop and deploy secure systems is an important one. This is not an easy task,
as many different design decisions and tradeoffs must be considered before one even
reaches the point of designing the cryptography.
The third part of my research involves actually creating and implementing practical,
useable (secure) systems to solve real world problems. While this thesis will not discuss
it, our first work in this space [17] involves Bitcoin, the first electronic cash system
to see widespread adoption. While Bitcoin offers the potential for new types of
financial interaction, it has significant limitations regarding privacy. Specifically,
because the Bitcoin transaction log is completely public, users have little privacy. We
created Zerocoin, a cryptographic extension to Bitcoin that augments the protocol to
allow for fully anonymous currency transactions and implemented a proof of concept
system. Zerocoin leverages cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs and other techniques
to provide a privacy layer on top of the already popular Bitcoin protocol. While this
thesis will not include Zerocoin, this brief high-level overview is useful for introducing
us to my work that will be discussed.
The applications of our work on Zerocoin go far beyond electronic cash. Indeed, they
provided us with a new technique that allowed us to develop decentralized anonymous
credentials in order to increase the security and deployability of existing anonymous
credentials systems [18], which will be discussed in this thesis. Anonymous credentials
6
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
provide a powerful tool for making assertions about identity while maintaining privacy.
However, a limitation of today’s anonymous credential systems is the need for a
trusted credential issuer — which is both a single point of failure and a target for
compromise. Furthermore, the need for such a trusted issuer can make it challenging
to deploy credential systems in practice, particularly in the ad hoc network setting
(e.g., anonymous peer-to-peer networks) where no single party can be trusted with this
responsibility. We proposed a novel anonymous credential scheme that eliminates the
need for a trusted credential issuer and implemented the system to show its practicality.
We also provided a number of practical applications for our techniques, including
resource management in ad hoc networks and prevention of Sybil attacks.
1.1.4 Organization
In the next three chapters, we present the aforementioned work from each of these
three areas. We begin by discussing cryptographic attacks, with my work on decrypting
user passwords encrypted with RC4 in TLS. After describing how systems can fail and
where things can go wrong, we move on to discuss ways to build more secure systems
and prevent problems from ever occurring by using cryptographic automation and
creating AutoGroup+. We conclude by discussing how to build cryptographic systems
in practice, because it is both impossible to work in either of the previous areas and be
a successful applied cryptography researcher without understanding this; this section
will focus on our work on decentralized anonymous credentials. Each chapter is drawn
7
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from the corresponding publication with little modification or additional content.
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Chapter 2
Evaluating, Attacking, and Securing
Existing Cryptographic Protocols
This chapter is based on joint work with Kenneth G Paterson and Thyla van der
Merwe while visiting Royal Holloway, University of London. The paper was originally
published in USENIX Security 2015 [19], while the complete version that appears in
this chapter was published at [20].
It is a truism in the community that “attacks only get better”, but this is often
insufficient to motivate fixes to existing schemes. As we have seen many times, only
when things are well and truly broken will they be fixed. This chapter demonstrates a
real life example of this situation, where a scheme with known problems was continually
used until a truly practical attack was demonstrated in a realistic application. We
now describe our work on decrypting user passwords encrypted with TLS using RC4.
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CHAPTER 2. EVALUATING, ATTACKING, AND SECURING EXISTING
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS
2.1 Introduction
The year 2013 was a(nother) bad one for the TLS protocol. After the trauma of
BEAST in 2011 and CRIME in 2012, came the Lucky 13 attack on CBC-mode in
TLS [21] and then, shortly after, attacks on RC4 in TLS [22] (see also [23, 24]). At the
time, most TLS (and SSL) deployments used either CBC-mode or RC4, since TLS 1.2
with its more modern ciphersuites based on AES-GCM was barely deployed. Indeed,
according to statistics obtained from the International Computer Science Institute
(ICSI) Certificate Notary project,1 in January 2013, there was a roughly 50/50 split
between CBC-mode and RC4 usage in the wild. And, at that time, no major browser
supported TLS 1.2 in its default settings.
Fast forward to February 2015: all mainstream browsers now support TLS 1.2,
TLS 1.3 is under development in the IETF, and the IETF has just published an RFC
deprecating the use of RC4 in TLS [8]. Moreover, statistics from SSL Pulse2 show that
server-side support for TLS 1.2 has grown rapidly, from less than 11.4% of the servers
surveyed in January 2013 to 54.5% in February 2015. At the same time, large vendors
have started to remove support for RC4. For example, Microsoft have made it possible
to disable RC4 across a wide range of their products,3 while CloudFlare, a major CDN
provider, recently removed RC4 ciphersuites from all their server configurations.4
1The ICSI Certificate Notary project collects statistics from live upstream SSL/TLS traffic in a
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At first sight, then, it would seem that the world has paid close attention to the
TLS attacks of 2013 and taken steps to remediate them. Most major implementations
patched against Lucky 13,5 while, according to [22], the only reasonable response to
the RC4 attacks was to stop using RC4 in TLS. However, the reality is not so rosy.
For example, SSL Pulse shows that, in February 2015, 74.5% of the roughly 150,000
sites surveyed still allowed negotiation of RC4. Even worse, a January 2015 survey6
of about 400,000 of the Alexa top 1 million sites show that 3712 of them, or 0.79%,
support only RC4 ciphersuites; meanwhile 8.75% force the use of RC4 in TLS 1.1 and
1.2, where better ciphers are available. And March 2015 data from the ICSI Certificate
Notary project shows that more than 30% of SSL/TLS connections are still using
RC4.7
It is instructive to examine the reasons why RC4 still remains so popular in TLS,
and why deprecating its use seems to be so hard.
We assert that, first and foremost, this is because, while the attacks of [22] break
RC4 in TLS in an academic sense, the attacks are far from being practical. For example,
the preferred cookie-recovering attack in [22] needs around 233 – 234 encryptions of
a 16-byte, base64-encoded secure cookie to reliably recover it. The number is so
high because, with mainstream browsers and taking into account the verbosity of the
HTTP protocol, the target cookie is not located near the start of the RC4 keystream,
5See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/lucky13.html for a list.
6https://securitypitfalls.wordpress.com/2015/02/01/january-2015-scan-results/
7An exact figure is hard to determine because of the “other” category in the relevant data which
is currently running at 4.9% and which may include some RC4-protected traffic.
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meaning that the strong, single-byte keystream biases in RC4 observed in [22] cannot
be exploited. Rather, the preferred attack from [22] uses the much weaker, long-term
Fluhrer-McGrew double-byte biases from [25]. This substantially increases the number
of required encryptions before the plaintext cookie can be reliably recovered, to the
point where, even with highly-tuned malicious JavaScript running in the victim’s
browser generating 6 million cookie-bearing HTTP POST requests per hour, the
wall-clock time to execute the attack would still be on the order of 2000 hours using
the experimental setup reported in [22]; moreover the attack would generate many
Terabytes of network traffic. Thus the practical threat posed by the RC4 attacks
reported in [22] is arguably quite limited.
The second reason for the continued popularity of RC4 in TLS is the presence of
legacy implementations which support only RC4, or which would be vulnerable to
the BEAST or Lucky 13 attacks on CBC-mode ciphersuites. Indeed, switching to
RC4 was a widely recommended countermeasure to the BEAST attack. Websites are
naturally loath to lose potential customers whose browsers are not equipped with the
latest patches or TLS versions and ciphersuites. Countering this, recent data from
CloudFlare8 shows that very few TLS clients now actually need RC4 – 0.0009% of
connections in the CloudFlare data. There is also a plethora of TLS deployment not
protecting HTTP traffic, increasingly including smart metering systems, industrial
control systems, and server-to-server communications. A further complexity, revealed
8See http://blog.cloudflare.com/killing-rc4-the-long-goodbye/ and http://blog.
cloudflare.com/the-web-is-world-wide-or-who-still-needs-rc4/
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in the CloudFlare data, is the presence of TLS-based VPNs or firewalls that perform
man-in-the-middle monitoring of SSL connections but that may need updating to stop
them from using RC4 for secure connections.
A third reason is performance: in settings where hardware support for AES is
not available (e.g. most mobile processors, including ARM processors), RC4 is fast,
significantly outperforming AES-based ciphersuites. There are certainly more secure
stream ciphers that are equally fast, or faster (for example, algorithms in the eStream
portfoliom9) but they are not standardised for use in TLS, and their widespread
deployment would take years.10
Nevertheless, it is a well-worn cliché that attacks only get better (i.e. stronger)
with time. However, this is a cliché that happens to be true for TLS, with the BEAST,
Lucky 13 and POODLE attacks all being illustrative examples. This paper presents
another illustration of this phenomenon for RC4 in TLS. We present attacks recovering
TLS-protected passwords whose ciphertext requirements are significantly reduced
compared to those of [22]: we achieve a reduction from 234 ciphertexts down to 226
– 228. We also describe proof-of-concept implementations of these attacks against
specific application-layer protocols making use of passwords, namely BasicAuth and
IMAP.
9http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/
10An exception is ChaCha20, which is experimentally deployed by Google in its Chrome browser
and for which a specification is nearing completion in IETF, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-irtf-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-08.
13
CHAPTER 2. EVALUATING, ATTACKING, AND SECURING EXISTING
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS
2.1.1 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we revisit the statistical methods of [22], refining, extending and
applying them to the specific problem of recovering TLS-protected passwords. Our
target is to reduce as much as possible the ciphertext requirements of the original RC4
attacks from [22]. Our overall objective is to bring the use of RC4 in TLS closer to the
point where it becomes indefensible and must be abandoned. This seems particularly
important in view of persistent rumours about the ability of nation-state adversaries
to break RC4 in real time, and the apparent need to strengthen the attacks in order
to convince practitioners to move to better ciphers.
Passwords are a good target for our attacks because they are still very widely used
on the Internet for providing user authentication, and are frequently protected using
TLS to prevent them being passively eavesdropped. It is true that major websites
use secure cookies for managing user authentication, but the authentication is usually
bootstrapped via password entry. However, to build effective attacks, we need to find
and exploit systems in which users’ passwords are automatically and repeatedly sent
under the protection of TLS, so that sufficiently many ciphertexts can be gathered for
our statistical analyses.
2.1.1.0.1 Bayesian analysis
We present a formal Bayesian analysis that combines an a priori plaintext distribu-
tion with keystream distribution statistics to produce a posteriori plaintext likelihoods.
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This analysis formalises and extends the procedure followed in [22] for single-byte
attacks. There, only keystream distribution statistics were used (specifically, biases in
the individual bytes in the early portion of the RC4 keystream) and plaintexts were
assumed to be uniformly distributed, while here we also exploit (partial) knowledge
of the plaintext distribution to produce a more accurate estimate of the a posteriori
likelihoods. This yields a procedure that is optimal (in the sense of yielding a maxi-
mum a posteriori estimate for the plaintext) if the plaintext distribution is known
exactly. In the context of password recovery, an estimate for the a priori plaintext
distribution can be empirically formed by using data from password breaches or by
synthetically constructing password dictionaries. We will demonstrate, via simulations,
that this Bayesian approach improves performance (measured in terms of success rate
of plaintext recovery for a given number of ciphertexts) compared to the approach
in [22].
Our Bayesian analysis concerns vectors of consecutive plaintext bytes, which is
appropriate given passwords as the plaintext target. This however means that the
keystream distribution statistics also need to be for vectors of consecutive keystream
bytes. Such statistics do not exist in the prior literature on RC4, except for the
Fluher-McGrew biases [25] (which supply the distributions for adjacent byte pairs
far down the keystream). Fortunately, in the early bytes of the RC4 keystream, the
single-byte biases are dominant enough that a simple product distribution can be
used as a reasonable estimate for the distribution on vectors of keystream bytes. We
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also show how to build a more accurate approximation to the relevant keystream
distributions using double-byte distributions. (Obtaining the double-byte distributions
to a suitable degree of accuracy consumed roughly 4800 core-days of computation;
for details, see Appendix A.) This approximation is not only more accurate but also
necessary when the target plaintext is located further down the stream, where the
single-byte biases disappear and where double-byte biases become dominant. Indeed,
our double-byte-based approximation to the keystream distribution on vectors can be
used to smoothly interpolate between the region where single-byte biases dominate
and where the double-byte biases come into play (which is exhibited as a fairly sharp
transition around position 256 in the keystream).
In the end, what we obtain is a formal algorithm that estimates the likelihood of
each password in a dictionary based on both the a priori password distribution and the
observed ciphertexts. This formal algorithm is amenable to efficient implementation
using either the single-byte based product distribution for keystreams or the double-
byte-based approximation to the distribution on keystreams. The dominant terms in
the running time for both of the resulting algorithms is O(nN) where n is the length
of the target password and N is the size of the dictionary used in the attack.
A major advantage of our new algorithms over the previous work in [22] is that
they output a value for the likelihood of each password candidate, enabling these to
be ranked and then tried in order in against a user’s account. This fits neatly with
how password authentication often works in practice: users are given a pre-determined
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number of tries before their account locks out.
2.1.1.0.2 Evaluation
We evaluate and compare our password recovery algorithms through extensive
simulations, exploring the relationships between the main parameters of our attack:
• The length n of the target password.
• The number S of available encryptions of the password.
• The starting position r of the password in the plaintext stream.
• The size N of the dictionary used in the attack, and the availability (or not) of
an a priori password distribution for this dictionary.
• The number of tries T made (meaning that our algorithm is considered successful
if it ranks the correct password amongst the top T passwords, i.e. the T passwords
with highest likelihoods as computed by the algorithm).
• Which of our two algorithms is used (the one computing the keystream statistics
using the product distribution or the one using a double-byte-based approxima-
tion).
• Whether the passwords are base64 encoded before being transmitted, or are sent
as raw ASCII/Unicode.
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Naturally, given the combinatorial explosion of possible parameter settings (and
the cost of performing simulations), we focus on comparing the performance with all
but one or two parameters or variables being fixed in each instance.
2.1.1.0.3 Proofs of concept
Our final contribution is to identify and apply our attacks to two specific and
widely-deployed applications making use of passwords over TLS: BasicAuth and
IMAP. In each case, we introduce the application and describe a proof-of-concept
implementation of our attacks against it, giving an indication of the practicality of
our attacks in each case.
For both applications, we have significant success rates with only S = 226 cipher-
texts, in contrast to the 234 ciphertexts required in [22]. This is because we are able to
force the target passwords into the first 256 bytes of plaintext, where the single-byte
keystream biases come into play. For example, with S = 226 ciphertexts, we would
expect to recover a length 6 BasicAuth password with 44.5% success rate with T = 5
tries; the rate rises to 64.4% if T = 100 tries are made. In practice, many sites
do not configure any limit on the number of BasicAuth attempts made by a client;
moreover a study [26] showed that 84% of websites surveyed allowed for up to 100
password guesses (though these sites were not necessarily using BasicAuth as their
authentication mechanism). As we will show, our result compares very favourably to
the previous attacks and to random guessing of passwords without any reference to
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the ciphertexts.
However, there is a downside too: to make use of the early, single-byte biases in
RC4 keystreams, we have to repeatedly cause TLS connections to be closed and new
ones to be opened. Because of latency in the TLS Handshake Protocol, this leads to a
significant slowdown in the wall clock running time of the attack; for S = 226, a fairly
low latency of 100ms, and exploiting browsers’ propensity to open multiple parallel
connections, we estimate a running time of around 300 hours for the attack. This is
still more than 6 times faster than the 2000 hours estimated in [22].
2.1.2 Chapter Organization
In Section 2.2 we provide further background on the RC4 stream cipher, the TLS
record protocol and its use of RC4, and password distributions. In Section 2.3 we
present our attacks; we evaluate them via simulation in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5
we explore the application of our attacks to BasicAuth and IMAP. We conclude in
Section 2.6.
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2.2 Further Background
2.2.1 The RC4 algorithm
Originally a proprietary stream cipher designed by Ron Rivest in 1987, RC4 is
remarkably fast when implemented in software and has a very simple description.
Details of the cipher were leaked in 1994 and the cipher has been subject to public
analysis and study ever since.
RC4 allows for variable-length key sizes, anywhere from 40 to 256 bits, and consists
of two algorithms, namely, a key scheduling algorithm (KSA) and a pseudo-random
generation algorithm (PRGA). The KSA takes as input an l-byte key and produces the
initial internal state st0 = (i, j,S) for the PRGA; S is the canonical representation of
a permutation of the numbers from 0 to 255 where the permutation is a function of the
l-byte key, and i and j are indices for S. The KSA is specified in Algorithm 1 where
K represents the l-byte key array and S the 256-byte state array. Given the internal
state str, the PRGA will generate a keystream byte Zr+1 as specified in Algorithm 2.
2.2.2 Single-byte biases in the RC4 Keystream
RC4 has several cryptographic weaknesses, notably the existence of various biases
in the RC4 keystream, see for example [25, 27, 28, 29, 22]. Large single-byte biases
are prominent in the early postions of the RC4 keystream. Mantin and Shamir [27]
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Algorithm 1: RC4 key scheduling (KSA)
input : key K of l bytes
output : initial internal state st0
begin
for i = 0 to 255 do
S[i]← i
j ← 0
for i = 0 to 255 do
j ← j + S[i] +K[i mod l]
swap(S[i],S[j])
i, j ← 0
st0 ← (i, j,S)
return st0
observed the first of these biases, in Z2 (the second byte of the RC4 keystream),
and showed how to exploit it in what they called a broadcast attack, wherein the
same plaintext is repeatedly encrypted under different keys. AlFardan et al. [22]
performed large-scale computations to estimate these early biases, using 245 keystreams
to compute the single-byte keystream distributions in the first 256 output positions.
They also provided a statistical approach to recovering plaintext bytes in the broadcast
attack scenario, and explored its exploitation in TLS. Much of the new bias behaviour
they observed was subsequently explained in [30]. Unfortunately, from an attacker’s
perspective, the single-byte biases die away very quickly beyond position 256 in the
RC4 keystream. This means that they can only be used in attacks to extract plaintext
bytes which are found close to the start of plaintext streams. This was a significant
complicating factor in the attacks of [22], where, because of the behaviour of HTTP
in modern browsers, the target HTTP secure cookies were not so located.
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Algorithm 2: RC4 keystream generator (PRGA)
input : internal state str
output : keystream byte Zr+1 updated internal state str+1
begin
parse (i, j,S)← str
i← i+ 1
j ← j + S[i]
swap(S[i],S[j])
Zr+1 ← S[S[i] + S[j]]
str+1 ← (i, j,S)
return (Zr+1, str+1)
2.2.3 Double-byte biases in the RC4 Keystream
Fluhrer and McGrew [25] showed that there are biases in adjacent bytes in RC4
keystreams, and that these so-called double-byte biases are persistent throughout the
keystream. The presence of these long-term biases (and the absence of any other
similarly-sized double-byte biases) was confirmed computationally in [22]. AlFardan
et al. [22] also exploited these biases in their double-byte attack to recover HTTP
secure cookies.
Because we wish to exploit double-byte biases in early portions of the RC4
keystream and because the analysis of [25] assumes the RC4 permutation S is uni-
formly random (which is not the case for early keystream bytes), we carried out
extensive computations to estimate the initial double-byte keystream distributions:
we used roughly 4800 core-days of computation to generate 244 RC4 keystreams for
random 128-bit RC4 keys (as used in TLS); we used these keystreams to estimate the
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double-byte keystream distributions for RC4 in the first 512 positions.
While the gross behaviour that we observed is dominated by products of the known
single-byte biases in the first 256 positions and by the Fluhrer-McGrew biases in the
later positions, we did observe some new and interesting double-byte biases. Since
these are likely to be of independent interest to researchers working on RC4, we report
in more detail on this aspect of our work in Appendix A.
2.2.4 RC4 and the TLS Record Protocol
We provide an overview of the TLS Record Protocol with RC4 selected as the
method for encryption and direct the reader to [22, 31, 32, 33] for further details.
Application data to be protected by TLS, i.e, a sequence of bytes or a record R, is
processed as follows: An 8-byte sequence number SQN, a 5-byte header HDR and R are
concatenated to form the input to an HMAC function. We let T denote the resulting
output of this function. In the case of RC4 encryption, the plaintext, P = T ||R, is
XORed byte-per-byte with the RC4 keystream. In other words,
Cr = Pr ⊕ Zr,
for the rth bytes of the ciphertext, plaintext and RC4 keystream respectively (for
r = 1, 2, 3 . . . ). The data that is transmitted has the form HDR||C, where C is the
concatenation of the individual ciphertext bytes.
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The RC4 algorithm is intialized in the standard way at the start of each TLS
connection with a 128-bit encryption key. This key, K, is derived from the TLS
master secret that is established during the TLS Handshake Protocol; K is either
established via the the full TLS Handshake Protocol or TLS session resumption. The
first few bytes to be protected by RC4 encryption is a Finished message of the TLS
Handshake Protocol. We do not target this record in our attacks since this message is
not constant over multiple sessions. The exact size of this message is important in
dictating how far down the keystream our target plaintext will be located; in turn
this determines whether or not it can be recovered using only single-byte biases. A
common size is 36 bytes, but the exact size depends on the output size of the TLS
PRF used in computing the Finished message and of the hash function used in the
HMAC algorithm in the record protocol.
Decryption is the reverse of the process described above. As noted in [22], any
error in decryption is treated as fatal – an error message is sent to the sender and
all cryptographic material, including the RC4 key, is disposed of. This enables an
active attacker to force the use of new encryption and MAC keys: the attacker can
induce session termination, followed by a new session being established when the
next message is sent over TLS, by simply modifying a TLS Record Protocol message.
This could be used to ensure that the target plaintext in an attack is repeatedly
sent under the protection of a fresh RC4 key. However, this approach is relatively
expensive since it involves a rerun of the full TLS Handshake Protocol, involving
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multiple public key operations and, more importantly, the latency involved in an
exchange of 4 messages (2 complete round-trips) on the wire. A better approach is
to cause the TCP connection carrying the TLS traffic to close, either by injecting
sequences of FIN and ACK messages in both directions, or by injecting a RST message
in both directions. This causes the TLS connection to be terminated, but not the TLS
session (assuming the session is marked as “resumable” which is typically the case).
This behaviour is codified in [33, Section 7.2.1]. Now when the next message is sent
over TLS, a TLS session resumption instance of the Handshake Protocol is executed
to establish a fresh key for RC4. This avoids the expensive public key operations and
reduces the TLS latency to 1 round-trip before application data can be sent. On large
sites, session resumption is usually handled by making use of TLS session tickets [34]
on the server-side.
2.2.5 Passwords
Text-based passwords are arguably the dominant mechanism for authenticating
users to web-based services and computer systems. As is to be expected of user-selected
secrets, passwords do not follow uniform distributions. Various password breaches
of recent years, including the Adobe breach of 150 million records in 2013 and the
RockYou leak of 32.6 million passwords in 2009, attest to this with passwords such
as 123456 and password frequently being counted amongst the most popular.11 For
11A comprehensive list of data breaches, including password breaches, can be found at http://
www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/.
25
CHAPTER 2. EVALUATING, ATTACKING, AND SECURING EXISTING
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS
example, our own analysis of the RockYou password data set confirmed this: the
number of unique passwords in the RockYou dataset is 14,344,391, meaning that
(on average) each password was repeated 2.2 times, and we indeed found the most
common password to be 123456 (accounting for about 0.9% of the entire data set).
Our later simulations will make extensive use of the RockYou data set as an attack
dictionary. A more-fine grained analysis of it can be found in [35]. We also make use
of data from the Singles.org breach for generating our target passwords. Singles.org is
a now-defunct Christian dating website that was breached in 2009; religiously-inspired
passwords such as jesus and angel appear with high frequency in its 12,234 distinct
entries, making its frequency distribution quite different from that of the RockYou set.
There is an extensive literature regarding the reasons for poor password selection
and usage, including [36, 37, 38, 39]. In [40], Bonneau formalised a number of
different metrics for analysing password distributions and studied a corpus of 70M
Yahoo! passwords (collected in a privacy-preserving manner). His work highlights
the importance of careful validation of password guessing attacks, in particular, the
problem of estimating attack complexities in the face of passwords that occur rarely –
perhaps uniquely – in a data set, the so-called hapax legomena problem. The approach
to validation that we adopt benefits from the analysis of [40], as explained further in
Section 2.4.
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2.3 Plaintext Recovery via Bayesian Analy-
sis
In this section, we present a formal Bayesian analysis of plaintext recovery attacks
in the broadcast setting for stream ciphers. We then apply this to the problem of
extracting passwords, specialising the formal analysis and making it implementable in
practice based only on the single-byte and double-byte keystream distributions.
2.3.1 Formal Bayesian Analysis
Suppose we have a candidate set of N plaintexts, denoted X , with the a priori
probability of an element x ∈ X being denoted px. We assume for simplicity that all
the candidates consist of byte strings of the same length n. For example X might
consist of all the passwords of a given length n from some breach data set, and then
px can be computed as the relative frequency of x in the data set. If the frequency
data is not available, then the uniform distribution on X can be assumed.
Next, suppose that a plaintext from X is encrypted S times, each time under
independent, random keys using a stream cipher such as RC4. Suppose also that the
first character of the plaintext always occurs in the same position r in the plaintext
stream in each encryption. Let c = (cij) denote the S × n matrix of bytes in which
row i, denoted c(i) for 0 ≤ i < S, is a vector of n bytes corresponding to the values in
positions r, . . . , r + n− 1 in ciphertext i. Let X be the random variable denoting the
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(unknown) value of the plaintext.
We wish to form a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate for X, given the observed
data c and the a priori probability distribution px, that is, we wish to maximise
Pr(X = x | C = c) where C is a random variable corresponding to the matrix of
ciphertext bytes.
Using Bayes’ theorem, we have
Pr(X = x | C = c) = Pr(C = c | X = x) · Pr(X = x)
Pr(C = c)
.
Here the term Pr(X = x) corresponds to the a priori distribution px on X . The term
Pr(C = c) is independent of the choice of x (as can be seen by writing Pr(C = c) =∑
x∈X Pr(C = c | X = x) · Pr(X = x)). Since we are only interested in maximising
Pr(X = x | C = c), we ignore this term henceforth.
Now, since ciphertexts are formed by XORing keystreams z and plaintext x, we
can write
Pr(C = c | X = x) = Pr(W = w)
where w is the S × n matrix formed by XORing each row of c with the vector x and
W is a corresponding random variable. Then to maximise Pr(X = x | C = c), it
suffices to maximise the value of
Pr(X = x) · Pr(W = w)
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over x ∈ X . Let w(i) denote the i-th row of the matrix w, so w(i) = c(i)⊕ x. Then w(i)
can be thought of as a vector of keystream bytes (coming from positions r, . . . r+n−1)
induced by the candidate x, and we can write




where, on the right-hand side of the above equation, Z denotes a random variable
corresponding to a vector of bytes of length n starting from position r in the keystream.
Writing B = {0x00, . . . 0xFF} for the set of bytes, we can rewrite this as:




where the product is taken over all possible byte strings of length n and Nx,z is defined
as:
Nx,z = |{i : z = c(i) ⊕ x}0≤i<S|,
that is, Nx,z counts the number of occurrences of vector z in the rows of the matrix
formed by XORing each row of c with candidate x. Putting everything together, our
objective is to compute for each candidate x ∈ X the value:




and then to rank these values in order to determine the most likely candidate(s).
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Notice that the expressions here involve terms Pr(Z = z) which are probabilities
of occurrence for n consecutive bytes of keystream. Such estimates are not generally
available in the literature, and for the values of n we are interested in (corresponding to
putative password lengths), obtaining accurate estimates for them by sampling many
keystreams would be computationally prohibitive. For example, our computation for
double-byte probabilities discussed in Appendix A involved 244 keystreams and, with
highly optimised code, consumed roughly 4800 core-days of computation. This yields




terms and is not amenable to calculation. Thus we must turn to approximate methods
to make further progress.
Note also that taking n = 1 in the above analysis, we obtain exactly the same
approach as was used in the single-byte attack in [22], except that we include the a
priori probabilities Pr(X = x) whereas these were (implicitly) assumed to be uniform
in [22].
2.3.2 Using a Product Distribution
Our task is to derive simplified ways of computing the expression
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and then apply these to produce efficient algorithms for computing (approximate)
likelihoods of candidates x ∈ X .
The simplest approach is to assume that the n bytes of the keystreams can be
treated independently. For RC4, this is actually a very good approximation in the
regime where single-byte biases dominate (that is, in the first 256 positions). Thus,
writing Z = (Zr, . . . , Zr+n−1) and z = (zr, . . . , zr+n−1) (with the subscript r denoting
the position of the first keystream byte of interest), we have:
Pr(Z = z) ≈
n−1∏
j=0




where now the probabilities appearing on the right-hand side are single-byte keystream
probabilities, as reported in [22] for example. Then writing x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and
rearranging terms, we obtain:
∏
z∈Bn








where Ny,z,j = |{i : z = ci,j ⊕ y}0≤i<S| counts (now for single bytes instead of length n
vectors of bytes) the number of occurrences of byte z in the column vector formed by
XORing column j of c with a candidate byte y.
Notice that, as in [22], the counters Ny,z,j for y ∈ B can all be computed efficiently
by permuting the counters N0x00,z,j, these being simply counters for the number of
occurrences of each byte value z in column j of the ciphertext matrix c.
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In practice, it is more convenient to work with logarithms, converting products
into sums, so that we evaluate for each candidate x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) an expression of
the form






Given a large set of candidates X , we can streamline the computation by first computing
the counters Ny,z,j, then, for each possible byte value y, the value of the inner sum∑
z∈BNy,z,j log(pr+j,z), and then reusing these individual values across all the relevant
candidates x for which xj = y. This reduces the evaluation of γx for a single candidate
x to n+ 1 additions of real numbers.
The above procedure, including the various optimizations, is specified as an attack
in Algorithm 3. We refer to it as our single-byte attack because of its reliance on the
single-byte keystream probabilities pr+j,z. It outputs a collection of approximate log
likelihoods {γx : x ∈ X} for each candidate x ∈ X . These can be further processed to
extract, for example, the candidate with the highest score, or the top T candidates.
2.3.3 Double-byte-based Approximation
We continue to write Z = (Zr, . . . , Zr+n−1) and z = (zr, . . . , zr+n−1) and aim to
find an approximation for Pr(Z = z) which lends itself to efficient computation of
approximate log likelihoods as in our first algorithm. Now we rely on the double-byte
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Algorithm 3: Single-byte attack
input : ci,j : 0 ≤ i < S, 0 ≤ j < n – array formed from S independent
encryptions of fixed n-byte candidate X
r – starting position of X in plaintext stream
X – collection of N candidates
px – a priori probability of candidates x ∈ X
pr+j,z (0 ≤ j < n, z ∈ B) – single-byte keystream distribution
output : {γx : x ∈ X} – set of (approximate) log likelihoods for candidates in X
begin
for j = 0 to n− 1 do
for z = 0x00 to 0xFF do
N ′z,j ← 0
for j = 0 to n− 1 do
for i = 0 to S − 1 do




for j = 0 to n− 1 do
for y = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for z = 0x00 to 0xFF do




for x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ X do
γx ← log(px) +
∑n−1
j=0 Lxj ,j
return {γx : x ∈ X}
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keystream distribution, writing
ps,z1,z2 := Pr((Zs, Zs+1) = (z1, z2)), s ≥ 1, k1, k2 ∈ B
for the probabilities of observing bytes (z1, z2) in the RC4 keystream in positions
(s, s+ 1). We estimated these probabilities for r in the range 1 ≤ r ≤ 511 using 244
RC4 keystreams – for details, see Appendix A; for larger r, these are well approximated
by the Fluhrer-McGrew biases [25] (as was verified in [22]).
We now make the Markovian assumption that, for each j,
Pr(Zj = zj | Zj−1 = zj−1 ∧ · · · ∧ Z0 = z0)
≈ Pr(Zj = zj | Zj−1 = zj−1),
meaning that byte j in the keystream can be modelled as depending only on the
preceding byte and not on earlier bytes. We can write
Pr(Zj = zj | Zj−1 = zj−1) =
Pr(Zj = zj ∧ Zj−1 = zj−1)
Pr(Zj−1 = zj−1)
where the numerator can then be replaced by pj−1,zj−1,zj and the denominator by
pj−1,zj−1 , a single-byte keystream probability. Then using an inductive argument and
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our assumption, we easily obtain:




giving an approximate expression for our desired probability in terms of single-byte and
double-byte probabilities. Notice that if we assume that the adjacent byte pairs are
independent, then we have pr+j,zj ,zj+1 = pr+j,zj · pr+j+1,zj+1 and the above expression
collapses down to the one we derived in the previous subsection.
For candidate x, we again write x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and rearranging terms, we
obtain: ∏
z∈Bn















where Ny1,y1,z1,z2,j = |{i : z1 = ci,j ⊕ y1 ∧ z2 = ci,j+1 ⊕ y2}0≤i<S| counts (now for
consecutive pairs of bytes) the number of occurrences of bytes (z1, z2) in the pair of
column vectors formed by XORing columns (j, j +1) of c with candidate bytes (y1, y2)
(and where Nxj ,z,r+j is as in our previous algorithm).
Again, the counters Ny1,y2,z1,z2,j for y1, y2 ∈ B can all be computed efficiently by
permuting the counters N0x00,0x00,z1,z2,j, these being simply counters for the number
of occurrences of pairs of byte values (z1, z2) in column j and j + 1 of the ciphertext
matrix c. As before, we work with logarithms, so that we evaluate for each candidate
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x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) an expression of the form














With appropriate pre-computation of the termsNy1,y2,z1,z2,j log(pr+j,z1,z2) andNy,z,r+j log(pr+j,z)
for all y1, y2 and all y, the computation for each candidate x ∈ X can be reduced to
roughly 2n floating point additions. The pre-computation can be further reduced by
computing the terms for only those pairs (y1, y2) actually arising in candidates in X
in positions (j, j + 1). We use this further optimisation in our implementation.
The above procedure is specified as an attack in Algorithm 4. We refer to it as our
double-byte attack because of its reliance on the double-byte keystream probabilities
ps,z1,z2 . It again outputs a collection of approximate log likelihoods {γx : x ∈ X} for
each candidate x ∈ X , suitable for further processing. Note that for simplicity of
presentation, it involves a quintuply-nested loop to compute the values Ny1,y2,z1,z2,j;
these values should of course be directly computed from the (n− 1) · 216 pre-computed




CHAPTER 2. EVALUATING, ATTACKING, AND SECURING EXISTING
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS
Algorithm 4: Double-byte attack
input : ci,j : 0 ≤ i < S, 0 ≤ j < n – array formed from S independent encryptions of fixed
n-byte candidate X
r – starting position of X in plaintext stream
X – collection of N candidates
px – a priori probability of candidates x ∈ X
pr+j,z (0 ≤ j < n, z ∈ B) – single-byte keystream distribution
pr+j,z1,z2 (0 ≤ j < n− 1, z1, z2 ∈ B) – double-byte keystream distribution
output : {γx : x ∈ X} – set of (approximate) log likelihoods for candidates in X
begin
for j = 0 to n− 2 do
for z1 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
N ′z,j ← 0
for z2 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
N ′z1,z2,j ← 0
for j = 0 to n− 2 do
for i = 0 to S − 1 do








for j = 1 to n− 2 do
for y = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for z = 0x00 to 0xFF do




for j = 0 to n− 2 do
for y1 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for y2 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for z1 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for z2 = 0x00 to 0xFF do






for x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ X do
γx ← log(px) +
∑n−2
j=0 Lxj ,xj+1,j −
∑n−2
j=1 Lxj ,j
return {γx : x ∈ X}
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We performed extensive simulations of both of our attacks, varying the different
parameters to evaluate their effects on success rates. We focus on the problem of
password recovery, using the RockYou data set as an attack dictionary and the
Singles.org data set as the set of target passwords. Except where noted, in each
simulation, we performed 256 independent runs of the relevant attack. In each attack
in a simulation, we select a password of some fixed length n from the Singles.org
password data set according to the known a priori probability distribution for that
data set, encrypt it S times in different starting positions r using random 128-bit keys
for RC4, and then attempt to recover the password from the ciphertexts using the set
of all passwords of length n from the entire RockYou data set (14 million passwords)
as our candidate set X . We declare success if the target password is found within the
top T passwords suggested by the algorithm (according to the approximate likelihood
measures γx). Our default settings, unless otherwise stated, are n = 6 and T = 5,
and we try all values for r between 1 and 256− n+ 1, where the single-byte biases
dominate the behaviour of the RC4 keystreams. Typical values of S are 2s where
s ∈ {20, 22, 24, 26, 28}.
Using different data sets for the attack dictionary and the target set from which
encrypted passwords are chosen is more realistic than using a single dictionary for both
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purposes, not least because in a real attack, the exact content and a priori distribution
of the target set would not be known. This approach also avoids the problem of
hapax legomena highlighted in [40]. However, this has the effect of limiting the success
rates of our attacks to less than 100%, since there are highly likely passwords in the
target set (such as jesus) that do not occur at all, or only have very low a priori
probabilities in the attack dictionary, and conversely. Figure 2.1 compares the use
of the RockYou password distribution to attack Singles.org passwords with the less
realistic use of the RockYou password distribution to attack RockYou itself. It can
be seen that, for the particular choice of attack parameters (S = 224, n = 6, T = 5,
double-byte attack), the effect on success rate is not particularly large. However, for
other attack parameters, as we will see below, we observe a maximum success rate of
around 80% for our attacks, whereas we would achieve 100% success rates if we used
RockYou against itself. The observed maximum success rate could be increased by
augmenting the attack dictionary with synthetically generated, site-specific passwords
and by removing RockYou-specific passwords from the attack dictionary. We leave
the development and evaluation of these improvements to future work.
Many data sets are available from password breaches. We settled on using RockYou
for the attack dictionary because it was one of the biggest data sets in which all
passwords and their associated frequencies were available, and because the distribution
of passwords, while certainly skewed, was less skewed than for other data sets. We
used Singles.org for the target set because the Singles.org breach occurred later than
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Figure 2.1: Recovery rate for Singles.org passwords using RockYou data set as
dictionary, compared to recovery rate for RockYou passwords using RockYou data set
as dictionary (S = 224, n = 6, T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte attack).
the RockYou breach, so that the former could reasonably used as an attack dictionary
for the latter. Moreover, the Singles.org distribution being quite different from that for
RockYou makes password recovery against Singles.org using RockYou as a dictionary
more challenging for our attacks. A detailed evaluation of the extent to which the
success rates of our attacks depend on the choice of attack dictionary and target set is
beyond the scope of this current work.
A limitation of our approach is that we assume the password length n to be already
known, whereas in reality this may not be the case. At least four potential solutions to
this problem exist. Firstly, in specific applications, n may leak via analysis of packet
lengths or other forms of traffic analysis. Secondly we can run our attacks for the
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full range of password lengths, possibly adjusting the likelihood measure γx for each
password candidate x to scale it appropriately by its length (except for the px term).
A third approach is to augment the shorter passwords with the known plaintext that
typically follows them in a specific targeted application protocol and then run our
attacks for a fixed, but now longer, n. A fourth approach applies in protocols which
use known delimiters to denote the end of a password (such as the = symbol seen at
the end of Base64 encodings for certain username/password lengths); here, the idea is
to adapt our general attacks to compute the likelihood that such a delimiter appears
in each possible position, and generate an estimate for n by selecting the position for
which the likelihood is highest.
2.4.2 Results
2.4.2.0.4 Single-Byte Attack
We ran the attack described in Algorithm 3 with our default parameters (n = 6,
T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251) for S = 2s with s ∈ {20, 22, 24, 26, 28} and evaluated the attack’s
success rate. We used our default of 256 independent runs per parameter set. The
results are shown in Figure 2.2. We observe that:
• The performance of the attack improves markedly as S, the number of ciphertexts,
increases, but the success rate is bounded by 75%. We attribute this to the use
of one dictionary (RockYou) to recover passwords from another (Singles.org)
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Figure 2.2: Recovery rates for single-byte algorithm for S = 220, . . . , 228 (n = 6, T = 5,
1 ≤ r ≤ 251).
– for the same attack parameters, we achieved 100% success rates when using
RockYou against RockYou, for example.
• For 224 ciphertexts we see a success rate of greater than 60% for small values
of r, the position of the password in the RC4 keystream. We see a drop to
below 50% for starting positions greater than 32. We note the effect of the key-
length-dependent biases on password recovery; passwords encrypted at starting
positions 16ℓ − n, 16ℓ − n + 1, . . . , 16ℓ − 1, 16ℓ, where ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , 6, have a
higher probability of being recovered in comparison to neighbouring starting
positions.
• For 228 ciphertexts we observe a success rate of more than 75% for 1 ≤ r ≤ 120.
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Figure 2.3: Recovery rates for double-byte algorithm for S = 220, . . . , 228 (n = 6,
T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251).
2.4.2.0.5 Double-Byte Attack
Analogously, we ran the attack of Algorithm 4 for S = 2s with s ∈ {20, 22, 24, 26, 28}
and our defaults of n = 6, T = 5. The results for these simulations are shown in
Figure 2.3. Note that:
• Again, at 224 ciphertexts the effect of key-length-dependent biases is visible.
• For 226 ciphertexts we observe a success rate that is greater than 78% for r ≤ 48.
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Figure 2.4: Performance of our single-byte algorithm versus a naive single-byte attack
based on the methods of AlFardan et al. (labelled “old”). (n = 6, T = 1, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251.)
2.4.2.0.6 Comparing the Single-Byte Attack with a Naive Algo-
rithm
Figure 2.4 provides a comparison between our single-byte algorithm with T = 1 and
a naive password recovery attack based on the methods of [22], in which the password
bytes are recovered one at a time by selecting the highest likelihood byte value in
each position and declaring success if all bytes of the password are recovered correctly.
Significant improvement over the naive attack can be observed, particularly for high
values of r. For example with S = 224, the naive algorithm essentially has a success
rate of zero for every r, whereas our single-byte algorithm has a success rate that
exceeds 20% for 1 ≤ r ≤ 63. By way of comparison, an attacker knowing the password
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length and using the obvious guessing strategy would succeed with probability 4.2%
with a single guess, this being the a priori probability of the password 123456 amongst
all length 6 passwords in the Singles.org dataset (and 123456 being the highest ranked
password in the RockYou dictionary, so the first one that an attacker using this
strategy with the RockYou dictionary would try). As another example, with S = 228
ciphertexts, a viable recovery rate is observed all the way up to r = 251 for our
single-byte algorithm, whereas the naive algorithm fails badly beyond r = 160 for even
this large value of S. Note however that the naive attack can achieve a success rate of
100% for sufficiently large S, whereas our attack cannot. This is because the naive
attack directly computes a password candidate rather than evaluating the likelihood
of candidates from a list which may not contain the target password. On the other
hand, our attack trivially supports larger values of T , whereas the naive attack is not
so easily modified to enable this feature.
2.4.2.0.7 Comparing the Single-Byte and Double-Byte Attacks
Figure 2.5 provides a comparison of our single-byte and double-byte attacks. With
all other parameters equal, the success rates are very similar for the initial 256 positions.
The reason for this is the absence of many strong double-byte biases that do not arise
from the known single-byte biases in the early positions of the RC4 keystream.
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Figure 2.5: Recovery rate of single-byte versus double-byte algorithm for S =
220, . . . , 228 (n = 6, T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251).
2.4.2.0.8 Effect of the a priori Distribution
As a means of testing the extent to which our success rates are influenced by
knowledge of the a priori probabilities of the candidate passwords, we ran simulations
in which we tried to recover passwords sampled correctly from the Singles.org dataset
but using a uniform a priori distribution for the RockYou-based dictionary used in
the attack. Figure 2.6 shows the results (S = 224, n = 6, T = 5, double-byte attack)
of these simulations, compared to the results we obtain by exploiting the a priori
probabilities in the attack. It can be seen that a significant gain is made by using the
a priori probabilities, with the uniform attack’s success rate rapidly dropping to zero
at around r = 128.
46




















Figure 2.6: Recovery rate for uniformly distributed passwords versus known a priori
distribution (S = 224, n = 6, T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte algorithm).
2.4.2.0.9 Effect of Password Length
Figure 2.7 shows the effect of increasing n, the password length, on recovery rates,
with the sub-figures showing the performance of our double-byte attack for different
numbers of ciphertexts (S = 2s with s ∈ {24, 26, 28}). Other parameters are set to
their default values. As intuition suggests, password recovery becomes more difficult
as the length increases. Also notable is that the ceiling on success rate of our attack
decreases with increasing n, dropping from more than 80% for n = 5 to around 50%
for n = 8. This is due to the fact that only 48% of the length 8 passwords in the
Singles.org data set actually occur in the RockYou attack dictionary: our attack is
doing as well as it can in this case, and we would expect stronger performance with
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Figure 2.7: Effect of password length on recovery rate (T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte
algorithm).
an attack dictionary that is better matched to the target site.
2.4.2.0.10 Effect of Increasing Try Limit T
Recall that the parameter T defines the number of password trials our attacks
make. The number of permitted attempts for specific protocols like BasicAuth and
IMAP is server-dependent and not mandated in the relevant specifications. Whilst
not specific to our chosen protocols, a 2010 study [26] showed that 84% of websites
surveyed allowed at least T = 100 attempts; many websites appear to actually allow
T = ∞. Figure 2.8 shows the effect of varying T in our double-byte algorithm for
different numbers of ciphertexts (S = 2s with s ∈ {24, 26, 28}). Other parameters are
set to their default values. It is clear that allowing large values of T boosts the success
rate of the attacks.
Note however that a careful comparison must be made between our attack with
parameter T and the success rate of the obvious password guessing attack given T
attempts. Such a guessing attack does not require any ciphertexts but instead uses
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Figure 2.8: Effect of try limit T on recovery rate (n = 6, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte
algorithm).
the a priori distribution on passwords in the attack dictionary (RockYou) to make
guesses for the target password in descending order of probability, the success rate
being determined by the a priori probabilities of the guessed passwords in the target
set (Singles.org). Clearly, our attacks are only of value if they significantly out-perform
this ciphertext-less attack.
Figure 2.9 shows the results of plotting log2(T ) against success rate α for S = 2s
with s ∈ {14, 16, . . . , 28}. The figure then illustrates the value of T necessary in our
attack to achieve a given password recovery rate α for different values of S. This
measure is related to the α-work-factor metric explored in [40] (though with the added
novelty of representing a work factor when one set of passwords is used to recover
passwords from a different set). To generate this figure, we used 1024 independent
runs rather than the usual 256, but using a fixed set of 1024 passwords sampled
according to the a priori distribution for Singles.org. This was in an attempt to
improve the stability of the results (with small numbers of ciphertexts S, the success
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(b) α ∈ [0, 0.2]
Figure 2.9: Value of T required to achieve a given password recovery rate α for S = 2s
with s ∈ {14, 16, . . . , 28} (n = 6, r = 133, double-byte algorithm).
rate becomes heavily dependent on the particular set of passwords selected and their
a priori probabilities, while we wished to have comparability across different values of
S). The success rates shown are for our double-byte attack with n = 6 and r = 133,
this specific choice of r being motivated by it being the location of passwords for our
BasicAuth attack proof-of-concept when the Chrome browser is used (similar results
are obtained for other values of r). The graph also shows the corresponding work
factor T as a function of α for the guessing attack (labeled “optimal guessing” in the
figure).
Figure 2.9a shows that our attack far outperforms the guessing attack for larger
values of S, with a significant advantage accruing for S = 224 and above. However,
as Figure 2.9b shows, the advantage over the guessing attack for smaller values of
S, namely 220 and below, is not significant. This can be attributed to our attack
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Figure 2.10: Recovery rate of Base64 encoded password versus a “normal” password
for 6-character passwords (T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte algorithm).
simply not being able to compute stable enough statistics for these small numbers of
ciphertexts. In turn, this is because the expected random fluctuations in the keystream
distributions overwhelm the small biases; in short, the signal does not sufficiently
exceed the noise for these low values of S.
2.4.2.0.11 Effect of Base64 Encoding
We investigated the effect of Base64 encoding of passwords on recovery rates,
since many application layer protocols use such an encoding. The encoding increases
the password length, making recovery harder, but also introduces redundancy, po-
tentially helping the recovery process to succeed. Figure 2.10 shows our simulation
results comparing the performance of our double-byte algorithm acting on 6-character
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passwords and on Base64 encoded versions of them. It is apparent from the figure
that the overall effect of the Base64 encoding is to help our attack to succeed. In
practice, the start of the target password may not be well-aligned with the Base64
encoding process (for example, part of the last character of the username and/or a
delimiter such as “:” may be jointly encoded with part of the first character of the
password). This can be handled by building a special-purpose set of candidates X
for each possibility. Handling this requires some care when mounting a real attack
against a specific protocol; a detailed analysis is deferred to future work.
2.4.2.0.12 Shifting Attack
It was observed in [22] and elsewhere that for 128-bit keys, RC4 keystreams exhibit
particularly large “key-length-dependent” biases at positions r = 16ℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , 7,
with the bias size decreasing with increasing ℓ. These large biases boost recovery rates,
as already observed in our discussion of Figure 2.2.
In certain application protocols and attack environments (such as HTTPS) it is
possible for the adversary to incrementally pad the plaintext messages so that the
unknown bytes are always aligned with positions having large keystream biases. Our
algorithm descriptions and code are both easily modified to handle this situation, and
we have conducted simulations with the resulting shift attack.
Figure 2.11 shows the results for the shift version of our double-byte algorithm. In
the shift attack, the true number of ciphertexts is equal to n× S, since we now use S
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Figure 2.11: Recovery rate of shift attack versus double-byte algorithm (n = 6, T = 5,
1 ≤ r ≤ 251).
ciphertexts at each of n shift positions. So a proper comparison would compare with
one of our earlier attacks using an appropriately increased value of S. Making this
adjustment, it can be seen that the success rate is significantly improved, particularly
for small values of r = 16ℓ where the biases are biggest.
2.5 Practical Validation
In this section we describe proof-of-concept implementations of our attacks against
two specific application-layer protocols running over TLS, namely BasicAuth and
IMAP.
53




Defined as part of the HTTP/1.0 specification [41], the Basic Access Authentication
scheme (BasicAuth) provides a means for controlling access to webpages and other
protected resources. Here we provide a high-level overview of BasicAuth and direct
the reader to [41] and [42] for further details.
BasicAuth is a challenge-response authentication mechanism: a server will present
a client with a challenge to which the client must supply the correct response in order
to gain access to the resource being requested. In the case of BasicAuth, the challenge
takes the form of either a 401 Unauthorized response message from an origin server,
or a 407 Proxy Authentication Required response message from a proxy server.
BasicAuth requires that the client response contain legitimate user credentials – a
username and password – in order for access to be granted. Certain web browsers may
display a login dialog when the challenge is received and many browsers present users
with the option of storing their user credentials in the browser, with the credentials
thereafter being automatically presented on behalf of the user.
The client response to the challenge is of the form
Authorization: Basic Base64(userid:password) where Base64(·) denotes the Base64
encoding function (which maps 3 characters at a time onto 4 characters of output).
Since the username and password are sent over the network as cleartext, BasicAuth
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needs to be used in conjunction with a protocol such as TLS.12
2.5.1.0.14 Attacking BasicAuth
To obtain a working attack against BasicAuth, we need to ensure that two condi-
tions are met:
• The Base64-encoded password included in the BasicAuth client response can be
located sufficiently early in the plaintext stream.
• There is a method for forcing a browser to repeatedly send the BasicAuth client
response.
We have observed that the first condition is met for particular browsers, including
Google Chrome. For example, we inspected HTTPS traffic sent from Chrome to an
iChair server.13. We observed the user’s Base64-encoded password being sent with
every HTTP(S) request in the same position in the stream, namely position r = 133
(this includes 16 bytes consumed by the client’s Finished message as well as the
20-bytes consumed by the TLS Record Protocol tag). For Mozilla Firefox, the value
of r was the less useful 349.
For the second condition, we adopt the methods used in the BEAST, CRIME
and Lucky 13 attacks on TLS, and also used in attacking RC4 in [22]: we assume
12The Digest Access Authentication Scheme was introduced to address the cleartext transmission
of passwords. See [42] for details.
13iChair is a popular system for conference reviewing, widely used in the cryptography research
community and available from http://www.baigneres.net/ichair. It uses BasicAuth as its user
authentication mechanism.
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that the user visits a site www.evil.com which loads JavaScript into the user’s
browser; the JavaScript makes GET or POST requests to the target website at
https://www.good.com by using XMLHttpRequest objects (this is permitted under
Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS), a mechanism developed to allow JavaScript
to make requests to a domain other than the one from which the script originates).
The Base64-encoded BasicAuth password is automatically included in each such
request. To force the password to be repeatedly encrypted at an early position in the
RC4 keystream, we use a MITM attacker to break the TLS connection (by injecting
sequences of TCP FIN and ACK messages into the connection). This requires some
careful timing on the part of the JavaScript and the MITM attacker.
We built a proof-of-concept demonstration of these components to illustrate the
principles. We set up a virtual network with three virtual machines each running
Ubuntu 14.04, kernel version 3.13.0-32. On the first machine, we installed iChair.
We configured the iChair web server to use RC4 as its default TLS cipher. The
second machine was running the Chrome 38 browser and acted as the client in our
attack. We installed the required JavaScript directly on this machine rather than
downloading from another site. The third machine acted as the MITM attacker,
required to intercept the TLS-protected traffic and to tear-down the TLS connections.
We used the Python tool Scapy14 to run an ARP poisoning attack on the client and
server from the MITM so as to be able to intercept packets; with the connection
14Available at http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/.
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hijacked we were able to force a graceful shutdown of the connection between the client
and the server after the password-bearing record had been observed and recorded. We
observed that forcing a graceful shutdown of each subsequent connection did allow for
TLS resumption (rather than leading to the need for a full TLS Handshake run).
With this setup, the JavaScript running in the client browser sent successive
HTTPS GET requests to the iChair server every 80ms. Our choice of 80ms was
motivated by the fact that for our particular configuration, we observed a total time
of around 80ms for TLS resumption, delivery of the password-bearing record and
the induced shutdown of the TCP connection. This choice enabled us to capture 216
encrypted password-bearing records in 1.6 hours (the somewhat greater than expected
time here being due to anomalies in network behaviour). Running at this speed, the
attack was stable over a period of hours.
We note that the latency involved in our setup is much lower than would be found
in a real network in which the server may be many hops away from the client: between
500ms and 1000ms is typical for establishing an initial TLS connection to a remote site,
with the latency being roughly half that for session resumptions. Notably, the cost of
public key operations is not the issue, but rather the network latency involved in the
round-trips required for TCP connection establishment and then running the TLS
Handshake. However, browsers also open up multiple TLS connections in parallel when
fetching multiple resources from a site, as a means of reducing the latency perceived
by users; the maximum number of concurrent connections per server is 6 for both the
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Chrome and Firefox browsers (though, we only ever saw roughly half this number
in practice, even with low inter-request times). This means that, assuming a TLS
resumption latency (including the client’s TCP SYN, delivery of the password-bearing
record and the final, induced TCP ACK) of 250ms and the JavaScript is running fast
enough to induce the browser to maintain 6 connections in parallel, the amount of
time needed to mount an attack with S = 226 would be on the order of 776 hours. If
the latency was further reduced to 100ms (because of proximity of the server to the
client), the attack execution time would be reduced to 312 hours.
Again setting n = 6 , T = 100, r = 133 and using the simulation results displayed
in Figure 2.10, we would expect a success rate of 64.4% for this setup (with S = 226).
For T = 5, the corresponding success rate would be 44.5%.
We emphasise that we have not executed a complete attack on these scales, but
merely demonstrated the feasibility of the attack in our laboratory setup.
2.5.2 The Internet Message Access Protocol
In Appendix B, we describe how our attacks can be applied to the Internet Message
Access Protocol (IMAP), a common client-server protocol for dealing with e-mail. In
summary, IMAP’s AUTHENTICATE PLAIN SASL and LOGIN mechanisms lead to user
passwords being sent over IMAP, with the password being protected by TLS thanks to
the execution of the IMAP STARTTLS command; moreover, in our experimental setup,
we saw the location of the password in the subsequent TLS session varying between
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positions 102 and 108 (depending on the server to which the client connected, but
with stable results on a per server basis). The main issue was the slow rate at which
our email client polled the server, leading to a correspondingly slow rate of encrypted
password transmission. We describe several ways by which this rate could be boosted
in Appendix B.
2.6 Conclusion and Open Problem
We have presented plaintext recovery attacks that derive from a formal Bayesian
analysis of the problem of estimating plaintext likelihoods given an a priori plaintext
distribution, suitable keystream distribution information, and a large number of
encryptions of a fixed plaintext under independent keys. We applied these ideas to
the specific problem of recovering passwords encrypted by the RC4 algorithm with
128-bit keys as used in TLS, though they are of course more generally applicable – to
uses of RC4 other than in TLS, and to stream ciphers with non-uniform keystream
distributions in general. Using large-scale simulations, we have investigated the
performance of these attacks under different settings for the main parameters.
We then studied the applicability of these attacks for two different application
layer protocols, BasicAuth and IMAP. In both cases, for certain browsers and clients,
the passwords were located at a favourable point in the plaintext stream and we could
induce the password to be repeatedly encrypted under fresh, random keys. We built
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a proof-of-concept implementation of both attacks. In both cases, it was difficult
to arrange for the rate of generation of encryptions to be as high as desired for a
speedy attack. For BasicAuth this was mainly due to the latency associated with TLS
connection establishment (even with session resumption) rather than any fundamental
barrier. For IMAP, the low rate of encryption was more due to the rate at which
an IMAP client polls an IMAP server. We discussed ways in which this could be
overcome.
Good-to-excellent password recovery success rates can be achieved using 224 –
228 ciphertexts in our attacks. We also demonstrated that our single-byte attack
for password recovery significantly outperforms a naive password recovery attack
based on the ideas of [22]. We observed an improvement over a guessing strategy
even for low numbers (222 or 224) of ciphertexts. By contrast to these numbers, the
preferred double-byte attack of [22] required on the order of 234 encryptions to recover
a 16-byte cookie, though without incurring the time overheads arising from TLS
session resumption that our approach incurs. In view of our results, we feel justified
in claiming that we have significantly narrowed the gap between the feasibility results
of [22] and our goal of achieving practical attacks on RC4 in TLS.
Our research has led to the identification of a number of areas for further work:
• Our Bayesian approach can also be applied to the situation where we model the
plaintext as a word from a language described as a Markov model with memory.
It would be interesting to investigate the extent to which this approach can
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be applied to either password recovery or more general analysis of, say, typical
HTTP traffic.
• We have focussed on the use of the single-byte biases described in [22] and
the double-byte biases of Fluhrer and McGrew (and from our own extensive
computations for the first 512 keystream positions). Other biases in RC4
keystreams are known, for example [28]. It is a challenge to integrate these in
our Bayesian framework, with the aim being to further improve our attacks.
• We identified new double-byte biases early in the RC4 keystream which deserve
a theoretical explanation.
• It would be an interesting challenge to develop algorithms for constructing
synthetic, site-specific dictionaries along with a priori probability distributions.
Existing work in this direction includes Marx’s WordHound tool.15
• We identified several open questions in the discussion of our simulation results,
including the effect of the choice of password data sets on success rates, and the
evaluation of different methods for recovering the target password’s length.
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Chapter 3
Tools for Developing Secure
Cryptographic Systems
This chapter is based on joint work with Joseph A. Akinyele and Susan Hohenberger
at Johns Hopkins University. The paper was originally published in Proceedings of the
22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages
1370–1381. ACM, 2015 [16], while the complete version that appears in this chapter
was published at [43].
Automation is a growing area within the field of cryptography, as it is one method
to help us see the greater deployment of cryptographic systems, but in a correct and
secure manner. Various factors can influence the use of cryptography, and in this
chapter we tackle the problem of the often large gap between the academic setting
where cryptography is designed and the practical world where it is used. We do this
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by creating AutoGroup+, a tool that securely and efficiently translates pairing based
cryptography from the theoretical setting to the practical one.
3.1 Introduction
Automation is increasingly being explored as a means of assisting in the design or
implementation of a cryptographic scheme. The benefits of using computer assistance
include speed, accuracy, and cost.
Recently, automation for pairing (also called bilinear) cryptographic constructions
(e.g., [11, 12, 44, 45]) has been under exploration. Since the seminal work of Boneh
and Franklin [13], interest in pairings is strong: they have become a staple at top
cryptography and security conferences, the open-source Charm library has been
downloaded thousands of times worldwide and recently pairing-commercializer Voltage
Security was acquired by a major US company (HP) [15].
Pairings are algebraic groups with special properties (see Section 3.2.1), which
are often employed for their functionality and efficiency. There are different types of
pairings: Type-I called “symmetric” is typically how schemes are presented and proven
secure in the literature, because it is simpler and the complexity assumptions can be
weaker; however, Type-III called “asymmetric” is typically the most efficient choice for
an implementation in terms of bandwidth and computation time.
Unfortunately, translating a Type-I scheme into the Type-III scheme is complicated.
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First, there may be thousands of different Type-III translations of a Type-I scheme and
the “best” translation may depend on the application. For instance, one translation
might optimize ciphertext size while another offers the fastest decryption time. Second,
each new translation requires a new proof under Type-III assumptions. Exploring and
analyzing all possible translations is clearly a great burden on a human cryptographer.
Indeed a small subset of manual translations of a scheme or particular set of schemes
is regarded as a publishable result in its own right, e.g., [46, 47, 48].
Given this translation hurdle, common practice today is to analyze a Type-I scheme,
but then use ad-hoc means to derive a Type-III translation that is unproven and
possibly non-optimal. The goal of this work is to address this problem by covering
new ground in cryptographic automation.
Our Contribution: The AutoGroup+ Tool. Our primary contribution is the
design, development, and performance evaluation of a new publicly-available1 tool, Au-
toGroup+, that automatically translates pairing schemes from Type-I to Type-III. The
output of AutoGroup+ is: (1) “secure” provided the input is “secure” (see Section 3.3.2)
and (2) optimal based on the user’s efficiency constraints (see Section 3.3.1.5).2 The
input is a computer-readable format of the Type-I construction, metadata about its
security analysis, and user-specified efficiency constraints. The output is a translated
Type-III construction (in text, C++, Python, or LATEX) with metadata about its
1AutoGroup+ can be downloaded at https://github.com/jhuisi/auto-tools.
2These claims regard the cryptographic transformation and exclude any software or run-time
errors.
65
CHAPTER 3. TOOLS FOR DEVELOPING SECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SYSTEMS
security analysis. (See Figure 3.1.)
The audience for this tool is: (1) anyone wanting to implement a pairing construc-
tion, and (2) pairing construction designers. We highlight some features.
New Scheme Description Language (SDL) Database. The input to AutoGroup+ re-
quires a computer-readable format of the Type-I construction, the Type-I complexity
assumption(s), and the Type-I security proof. It was a challenge to create a means of
translating human-written security proofs into SDL. We focused on a common type
of proof exhibiting a certain type of black-box reduction.3 We created a new SDL
structure for representing assumptions and reductions of this type that may be of
independent interest. Additionally, we did the tedious work of carefully transcribing
five assumptions, eight reductions and improving the SDLs for nine popular construc-
tions (from [12]). (See Appendix D for an example of a simple case.) One transcribed,
however, these SDL files can be reused. We believe the future of cryptographic
automation research will involve processing the assumptions and proofs; thus our
database is made public as a testbed for future automation research.
Speed of Tool. AutoGroup+ took less than 21 seconds to process any of the test set,
which included seven simple schemes (16 or less solutions), three medium schemes
(256 to 512 solutions), and three complex schemes (1024 to 2048 solutions). (The
preference for simple schemes was to compare with prior work.) This measures from
SDL input to a C++ (or alternative) output. Speed is very important here for usage,
3The theoretical translation security results of [44] on which we will base our security are also
limited to this class of proof.
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because we anticipate that designers may iteratively use this tool like a compiler and
implementors may want to try out many different efficiency optimizations.
In contrast, in CRYPTO 2014, Abe, Groth, Ohkubo and Tango [44] laid out an
elegant theoretical framework for doing pairing translations in four steps. It left open
the issue of whether their framework was practical to implement for a few reasons: (1)
they automated only one of four steps (code not released), (2) their algorithm for this
step was exponential time, and (3) they tested it on only simple and medium schemes,
but their medium scheme took over 1.75 hours for one step. Our fully automated
translation of that scheme took 6.5 seconds, which is much more in line with the
“compiler”-like usage we anticipate.
We attribute our drastic efficiency improvement in part to our use of the Z3 SMT
Solver. As described in Section 3.3, we encode the translation of the scheme, its
assumption(s) and its reduction as a constraint-satisfaction problem and then use Z3
to quickly find the satisfying set of solutions.
New Results. We evaluated AutoGroup+ on 9 distinct constructions (plus 4 additional
variations of one scheme), with various optimization priorities, for 48 bandwidth-
optimizing translations. In Figure 3.8, we report the sizes compared to the symmetric
case, which are significantly smaller. In Figure 3.9, we report on over 140 timing
experiments resulting from the translations. Due both to the asymmetric setting and
AutoGroup+’s optimizations, in most cases, the running times were reduced to less
than 10% of the symmetric case. In Figure 3.10, we report on the effect that different
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levels of complexity have on translation time for a single scheme.
In Section 3.5, we compare the performance of AutoGroup+ to prior automation
works, published manual translations, and translations existing as source code in the
Advanced Crypto Software Collection [49] and Charm library [50]. We discovered a
few things. In fourteen points of comparison with AutoGroup, AutoGroup+ matches
those solutions and provides a security validation and new assumptions, adding only
a few additional seconds of running time. In three points of comparison with Abe et
al. [44] and subsequent personal communications [51], our translated results match.
In the five points of overlap with ACSC and Charm, we are able to confirm
the security and ciphertext-size optimality of one broadcast encryption and one
hierarchical identity-based encryption implementation. We are also able to confirm
the security of two signature implementations, although only one is signature-size
optimal. These confirmations are new results. Our tool was able to confirm the
ciphertext-size optimality, but not the security of the Charm implementation of Dual
System Encryption [52] (meaning it may not be secure). That implementation made
changes to the keys outside the scope of the translations here or in [12, 44]. However,
our tool did find a secure translation with the same ciphertext-size.
Overall, our tests show that the tool can produce high-quality solutions in just
seconds, demonstrating that pairing translations can be practically and securely
performed by computers.
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3.1.1 Prior Work
The desirability of translating Type-I to Type-III pairings is well documented.
First, this is an exercise that cryptographers are still actively doing by hand. In
PKC 2012, Ramanna, Chatterjee and Sarkar [46] nicely translated the dual system
encryption scheme of Waters [52] from the Type-I pairing setting to a number of
different Type-III possibilities. Recently, Chen, Lim, Ling, Wang and Wee [47, 48]
presented an elegant semi-general framework for (re-)constructing various IBE, Inner-
Product Encryption and Key-Policy Functional Encryption schemes in the Type-III
setting, assuming the SXDH assumption holds.4 These works go into deeper creative
detail (changing the scheme or adding assumptions) than our automator, and thus
mainly get better results, but then, these works appear to have taken significant
human resources. In contrast, our work offers a computerized translation as a starting
point.
The Advanced Crypto Software Collection (ACSC) [49], including the Charm
library [50], contains many Type-III implementations of schemes that were published
and analyzed in the Type-I format. To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal
analysis of these converted schemes and thus also no guarantees that the translations
are secure or optimal efficiency-wise for a user’s specific application. (We remark
that ACSC/Charm makes no claims that they are secure or optimal.) The public
Github records for Charm show that it has been downloaded thousands of times;
4Informally, the SXDH assumption asserts that in a Type-III pairing group, there exist no efficient
isomorphisms from G1 to G2 or from G2 to G1.
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thus, it would be prudent to verify these implementations. (See our results on this in
Section 3.5.)
In ACM CCS 2013, Akinyele, Green and Hohenberger [12] presented a publicly-
available tool called AutoGroup, which offered an automated translation from Type-I
to Type-III pairing schemes. This work employed sophisticated tools, such as the
Z3 Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver produced by Microsoft Research (see
Section 3.2), to quickly find a set of possible assignments of elements into G1 or G2.
There was not, however, any guarantee that the resulting translation remained secure.
Indeed, Akinyele et al. [12] explicitly framed their results as follows: translation has
two parts: (1) the search for an efficient translation, and (2) a security analysis of it.
They automated the first part and left the security analysis to a human cryptographer.
Since they made their source code public, we used it as a starting point and thus
named our work after theirs.
While using AutoGroup is certainly faster than a completely manual approach, the
lack of a security guarantee is a real drawback. At that time, there was simply no
established theory on how to generalize these translations.
Fortunately, in CRYPTO 2014, Abe, Groth, Ohkubo and Tango [44] pushed the
theory forward in this area. They elegantly formalized the notion that if certain
dependencies from the Type-I complexity assumption(s) and the reduction in the
security analysis were added to the dependencies imposed by the scheme itself, then
there was a generic way to reason about the security of the translated scheme. Their
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main theorem, which we will later use, can informally be stated as:
Theorem 3.1.1 (Informal [44]). Following the conversion method of [44], if the Type-I
scheme is correct and secure in the generic Type-I group model, then its converted
Type-III scheme is correct and secure in the generic Type-III group model.
There are four steps in their translation: (1) build a dependency graph between the
group elements for each algorithm in the construction, the complexity assumption(s)
and the security reduction (In the graph, elements are nodes and a directed edge
goes from g to h if h is derived from g, such as h = gx.), (2) merge all graphs into a
single graph, (3) split this graph into two graphs (where elements of the first graph
will be assigned to G1 and elements of the second assigned to G2), and (4) derive the
converted scheme.
For the four schemes tested in [44], steps (1), (2), and (4) were done by hand.
The algorithm for step (3) was exponential in two variables5 and the Java program to
handle step (3) reported taking 1.75 hours on a medium scheme. Thus, this is a great
theory advance, but it left open the question of whether the entire translation could
be efficiently automated as a “real-time” tool.
AutoGroup+ in a Nutshell. In short, prior work admitted a public tool that is fast, but
possibly insecure [12], and a cryptographic framework that is slow, but secure [44]. Our
goal was to realize the best of both worlds. Even though the implementations differed,
we discovered that both works began by tracing generator to pairing dependencies,
5Their splitting algorithm runs exponentially in both the number of pairings and the bottom
nodes (without outgoing edges) of the dependency graph. Thus, scalability is a real concern.
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where [12] did this bottom up and [44] used a top down approach. Since both of these
representations can be helpful for different optimizations, AutoGroup+ does both. It
also traces these dependencies for the complexity assumptions and reductions. The
pairings and hash variables in the combined dependency graph are translated into
a formula and constraints, and then fed into a SMT solver. The output set is then
efficiently searched for an optimal solution using the SMT solver again, then verified as
a valid graph split (as formalized in [44]). Finally, if the split is valid, then a converted
scheme and complexity assumption(s) are output.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Pairings
Let G1, G2 and GT be groups of prime order p. A map e : G1 × G2 → GT is
an admissible pairing (also called a bilinear map) if it satisfies the following three
properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2, and a, b ∈ Zp, it holds that e(ga, hb) =
e(gb, ha) = e(g, h)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: if g and h are generators of G1 and G2, resp., then e(g, h) is a
generator of GT .
3. Efficiency: there exists an efficient method that given any g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2,
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computes e(g, h).
A pairing generator is an algorithm that on input a security parameter 1λ, outputs
the parameters for a pairing group (p, g, h,G1,G2,GT , e) such that p is a prime in
Θ(2λ), G1, G2 and GT are groups of order p where g generates G1, h generates G2
and e : G1 ×G2 → GT is an admissible pairing.
The above pairing is called an asymmetric or Type-III pairing. This type of
pairing is generally preferred in implementations for its efficiency. We also consider
symmetric or Type-I pairings, where there is an efficient isomorphism ψ : G1 → G2
(and vice versa) such that a symmetric map is defined as e : G1 × ψ(G1)→ GT . We
generally treat G = G1 = G2 for simplicity and write e : G×G→ GT . These types of
pairings are typically preferred for presenting constructions in the academic literature
for two reasons. First, they are simpler from a presentation perspective, requiring
fewer subscripts and other notations. More importantly, they are sometimes preferred
because the underlying symmetric assumption on which the proof is based may be
viewed as simpler or weaker than the corresponding asymmetric assumption.
We include current efficiency numbers for Type-I and Type-III groups in Ap-
pendix C, demonstrating the significant advantages of the latter.
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3.2.2 The Z3 Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
Solver
Our implementation also relies on the power of the state-of-the-art Z3 SMT
solver [53] developed at Microsoft Research. SMT is a generalization of boolean
satisfiability (or SAT) solving where the goal is to decide whether solutions exist to a
given logical formula. The publicly available Z3 is one such tool that is highly efficient
in solving constraint satisfaction problems and used in many different applications.
3.2.3 A Scheme Description Language (SDL) and
Toolchain
This work builds on the efforts of prior automation works [11, 12] which include
several tools such as a scheme description language (or SDL), an accompanying parser
for SDL, a code generator that translates SDL schemes into executable code in either
C++ or Python, and a LATEX generator for SDL descriptions. We obtained all these
prior tools from the publicly-available AutoTools GitHub repository.6 Our code
and SDL database will be made public in this repository as well. The SDL for the
constructions are the same in AutoGroup and AutoGroup+; the difference is that the
latter also includes SDL for assumptions and security reductions. Since we used the
code of AutoGroup as a starting point, we derived our tool name from it.
6Project link: https://github.com/jhuisi/auto-tools
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3.3 The AutoGroup+ System
As described in Section 3.1, AutoGroup+ is a new tool built to realize the best of
both worlds from a prior tool called AutoGroup [12] (fast, but no security guarantees)
and new theoretical insights [44] (secure, but exponential time and no public tool.)
3.3.1 How It Works
We begin with an illustration of the AutoGroup+ system in Figure 3.1. This system
takes in the description of a symmetric (Type-I) pairing-based scheme S, together
with metadata about its security and user-desired efficiency constraints, and outputs
an asymmetric (Type-III) pairing-based translation S ′, together with metadata about
its security. Informally, if S was secure, then S ′ will be both secure and optimal for
the constraints set by the user over the space of “basic” translations.
3.3.1.1 Step 1: Generating Computer-Readable Inputs
AutoGroup+ operates on four inputs: an abstract description of the (1) scheme
itself, (2) the complexity assumption(s) on which the scheme is based, (3) the black-box
reduction in the scheme’s proof of security, and (4) a set of efficiency optimization
constraints specified by the user (e.g., optimize for smallest key or ciphertext size.). The
abstract descriptions are all specified in a Scheme Description Language (SDL) [11, 12].
The need for SDL representations of the complexity assumptions and security
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Figure 3.1: A high-level presentation of the AutoGroup+ tool. Components that are new
or improved, over AutoGroup, are included with dashed lines. Both AutoGroup+ and
AutoGroup use external tools Z3, SDL Parser and Code generator (omitted from the
figure).
reductions are new challenges for this work. To run our Section 3.5 tests, we had to
translate the text in the published papers to the SDL format by hand. This was a
time-consuming and tedious task. However, we maximize the benefit of doing this,
by making these SDL files publicly available. This enables anyone to check their
correctness and provides a ready-made base of test files for any future automation
exercises that require this deeper scheme analysis.
One novel and curious observation we made during these experiments was that how
group elements were derived in the symmetric group impacted the dependency graphs
and therefore the asymmetric results. To say this another way, two schemes computing
the exact same elements, but in different ways, could have different dependency graphs
and therefore different asymmetric translations. As a toy example, suppose a scheme
has PK = (g, A = ga, B = gb) and SK = (PK, a, b). Now suppose that as part of a
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signing algorithm, the holder of SK must compute the value C = gab. Suppose in
Scheme 1, the signer computes this as x = ab mod p and C = gx. Suppose in Scheme
2, the signer computes this as C = Ab. Then in the dependency graph for Scheme
1, there is a root node g, with nodes A and C hanging off it. Whereas for the graph
of Scheme 2, there is a root node g with A off it, and C off of A. The importance of
these differences comes alive when we attempt to split the graph (see Step 3.3.1.4).
Suppose there is the pairing e(A,C). Then in Scheme 1, the generator g must be
split, but A can be assigned to G1 and C to G2, resulting in a 4 element public key.
However, in Scheme 2, the generator g and the element A must be split, with A1 ∈ G1
and A2 ∈ G2, so that one can compute C = (A2)b ∈ G2. This results in a 5 element
public key. The general rule is that the fewer unnecessary dependencies the better.
Interestingly, Abe et al. [44] sometimes added dependencies that did not exist in the
original schemes. For instance, for the Waters 2005 IBE [54], Waters clearly states to
choose g2, u′, ui as fresh random generators, but Abe et al. explicitly "assume" that
they are generated from a separate generator g. For this particular scheme, this does
not impact the asymmetric translations, but in theory it could.
Our experiments did not add any dependencies. We note that in this step, a
human is not being tasked with any job but simple transcription of the input into a
language the computer can understand.
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3.3.1.1.1 System Limitations and Allowable Inputs
This system shares some of the same limitations as prior works [12, 44]. First, this
is a junk-in-makes-junk-out system. AutoGroup+ assumes that the security reduction is
correct, the complexity assumptions are true, and that the SDL was typed in correctly.
If any of these turn out to be false, the output cannot be depended on. Fortunately,
we can mitigate these risks as follows. The correctness of the security reductions might
be verified automatically using a number of tools, such as EasyCrypt [10], but this
likely requires further research. The pairing-based assumptions may be sanity-checked
in the generic group model using the recently developed tool by Barthe et al. [45]
from CRYPTO 2014. Finally, the SDL transcriptions can be verified in the usual
crowd-based manner which we encourage by making them public.
Second, the system does not accept all possible schemes that might appear in the
literature. AutoGroup+ supports only prime-order symmetric pairing schemes with
a “standard” reduction analysis7. It can support most non-interactive assumptions.
It can also support dynamic (also called q-based) assumptions, where the size of the
assumption may grow depending on the usage of the scheme. It can also support
interactive (also called oracle-based) assumptions such as the LRSW assumption
behind the popular Camenisch-Lysyanskaya [55] pairing-based signatures.
Third, how the scheme hashes into pairing groups also may disqualify it from
7We refer the reader to Abe et al. [44] for a formal definition of the allowed reductions. Roughly,
we mean an analysis where there is an efficient algorithm called a reduction that is successful in
solving the hard problem (underlying the complexity assumption) given black-box access to an
adversary that successfully attacks the scheme.
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being translated. We now give an example of how to alter the Setup algorithm of the
Waters 2005 IBE scheme [54], so that AutoGroup+ cannot translate it. (Indeed, it
is not clear to us if a translation even exists.) In the original Setup algorithm, the
master authority chooses a generator g ∈ G at random. Then public parameter g1
is derived from g, while parameters g2, u0, . . . , un ∈ G are chosen independently at
random. Instead, suppose we treat the hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G as a random
oracle. Let generator g ∈ G be computed as g = H(ID), where ID is some string
describing the master authority. Then g1 is derived from g as before, but we set
g2 = g
r, u0 = g
r0 , . . . , un = g
rn for random r, r0, . . . , rn ∈ Zp (where p is the order of
G). It is easy to see that the public parameters have the same distribution as before
(assuming the random oracle model); all we have changed is how the master authority
samples these parameters. Thus, this variant of the Waters IBE remains secure in
the symmetric setting, and yet it is not clear how to translate it to the asymmetric
setting. We return to this example in Section 3.5.
These limitations also appear in the theoretical work of Abe et al. [44], and
fortunately, these issues seem relatively rare and did not come up for any of the
schemes we tested (except our hand-made counterexample). As in [12, 44], we note
that if AutoGroup+ cannot produce a translation, it does not imply that a translation
does not exist. A characterization of untranslatable schemes is an open theoretical
problem.
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3.3.1.2 Step 2: Extracting Algebraic Dependencies
Once AutoGroup+ has parsed all its input files, it begins processing them to graph
the algebraic dependencies between source group elements in a scheme, assumption
and reduction. All source group elements are nodes in the graph and a directed edge
exists if there is a direct dependency between two elements. E.g., if h = gx, then h is
derived from g and we place an edge from g and h.
AutoGroup+ extracts the dependency graphs automatically from the SDL for each
input file and builds a distinct graph from the SDL representations and metadata.
AutoGroup+ defines two new procedures that programmatically extract the dependency
graph for the assumption(s) as well as the reduction(s) (see Section 3.4 for an example).
Then, AutoGroup+ reuses logic from AutoGroup to programmatically build the graph of
the scheme by tracking the generators in the setup algorithm and by tracing backward
from each pairing in the scheme. It merges the program slice (or trace) extracted for
each pairing input into one dependency graph for the scheme. The resulting graphs are
the same as those produced by Abe et al. [44] (except where we reduced dependencies
by computing elements more directly as discussed in the last step.)
The work of Abe et al. [44] required a human to build (and later merge) these
dependency graphs by hand and the graphs were constructed starting from the common
generators downward. The AutoGroup work of Akinyele et al. [12] automatically derived
these graphs for the scheme only from the SDL description of the scheme. They did
not consider the assumptions or reduction dependencies. Indeed, AutoGroup only
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graphed the dependencies as a traceback from the pairings, whereas AutoGroup+ also
adds a top-down analysis from the assumption down to the pairings for the security
logic.
3.3.1.3 Step 3: Merge Dependency Graphs
After extracting the dependencies, AutoGroup+ has a set of distinct graphs:
one graph that represents dependencies from the setup, key generation, encryp-
tion/signature and decryption/verification algorithms, as well as a graph for each
complexity assumption and one or more graphs for the reduction. These graphs
are then systematically merged together using the metadata provided with the SDL
inputs. The metadata includes a reduction map which relates the names of source
group elements in the reduction to those in the assumption. We require this map
to understand which nodes represent the same group element (across the scheme,
assumption and reduction) to simplify merging into a single node. See the example
in Section 3.4. AutoGroup+ programmatically checks the type information in the
reduction map across all SDL inputs to ensure correctness during the merge.
3.3.1.4 Step 4: Assign Variables using the SMT Solver
This is the most complex step in the automation. In the symmetric setting, all
group elements in the scheme were in G. To move to the asymmetric setting, we
must assign elements to either G1 or G2 in such a way that the dependencies between
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elements are not violated (e.g., if h = gx, then both g, h must be in the same group)
and such that for all variables a, b, if we have a pairing between them e(a, b), then
a and b must be in distinct source groups (e.g., a ∈ G1 and b ∈ G2 or vice versa).
Such an assignment may not be feasible (see such an example in Section 3.3.1.1) or
it may require that one or more variables in the symmetric scheme be duplicated
in the asymmetric scheme with one assigned to G1 and another to G2. E.g., in the
symmetric setting if g ∈ G, a = gx and b = gy and these elements are paired as e(a, b),
then in the asymmetric setting, g will be split into g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, where a = gx1
and b = gy2 , so that one can compute e(a, b).
To efficiently make these variable assignments, AutoGroup+ follows the approach
of AutoGroup in that it uses a powerful Z3 Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver
produced by Microsoft Research (see Section 3.2) to compute the set of all possible
splits (i.e., all possible variable assignment combinations) and then later identifies the
best one. Z3 takes as input a logical formula and determines whether valid variable
assignments exist that evaluate that formula to true. Similar to AutoGroup, Auto-
Group+ expresses the pairing equations as a logical formula of conjunctions and
inequality operations over binary variables. For example, e(a, b) · e(c, d) is translated
to the logical formula P1[0] ̸= P1[1] ∧ P2[0] ̸= P2[1] where P1[0] is a reference to a,
P1[1] to b, and so on. AutoGroup+ simply follows the pairing identifier convention
established by Abe et al. [44].
One major difference between AutoGroup+ and AutoGroup is that the former’s
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dependency graphs include dependencies based on the assumptions and reductions.
The formula is derived from the pairings that occur in the graph (from the construction,
reduction and assumption(s)) with a conjunction joining each pairing piece, plus extra
constraints added for variables that cannot be duplicated (regarding hashing). This
formula is then fed into the solver. The solver returns a set of 0 or 1 assignments
for each variable. We then apply each solution to the merged dependency graph to
generate the split (variables assigned to 0 on one side and the rest on the other).
3.3.1.5 Step 5: Search for Optimal Solution
There are often many (possibly thousands) of ways to translate a symmetric scheme
into an asymmetric scheme; thus, we can end up with many feasible graph splits.
Indeed, the output of the SMT solver in the last step is a set of assignments of the
variables. In this step, we again use the SMT solver to deduce which assignment from
this set is “best”. AutoGroup+ allows selection of assignments based on a number of
user-specified optimization constraints. For public-key encryption, the user can choose
to minimize the public-key, assumption, secret key and/or ciphertext size. Similarly
for signature schemes, the user can mimize the public-key parameters, assumption,
and/or the signature size.
To select an optimal assignment, AutoGroup+ encodes these user requirements as
parameters of some objective function. We then call the solver a second time with
this objective function set to rank/narrow the given solutions to one. Depending on
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the optimization goal, the objective function can be specified in one of two ways. If
reducing public-key size or the assumption, then we are concerned with minimizing
the duplication of source group elements. As such, we first specify an EvalGraph
function that the solver uses to compute the splits for each element in the public key
or assumption: EvalGraph(Aj, B,G) = S, where Aj = a1, . . . , an represents pairing
input variable assignments for the j-th solution (each ai variable is either 0 = G1 or
1 = G2), B = b1, . . . , bm represents the source group elements to minimize either in
the assumption or public-key, and G represents the merged dependency graph.
Our search algorithm first applies the EvalGraph function to determine how the
bi values are assigned for each solution. Once the bi values are assigned, we then
compute S = s1, . . . , sm where each si corresponds to one of three values for each bi
assignment. That is, let a w1 value denote a G1 only assignment, w2 is G2 only, and
w3 = w1 +w2 is both a G1 and G2 assignment (or simply a split). We then set w1 and
w2 to the group size of G1 and G2 for Type-III pairing curves (e.g., BN256). Each
solution is ranked in terms of splits and the total size of group elements in B. Our
search returns the j-th solution that results in the fewest splits in B with the smallest
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For the other optimization options (i.e., secret-key, ciphertext, etc), we can reuse the
objective function specified by AutoGroup as is:
min
j∈|A|
F (Aj, C, w1, w2) =
n∑
i=1
((1− ai) · w1 + ai · w2) · ci (3.2)
where the Aj represents the j-th solution as before, C = {c1, . . . , cn} represent some
cost associated with each ai variable reference, and w1 and w2 correspond to weights
(for different Type-III pairing curves) over groups G1 and G2. By encoding these
cost values, it is feasible to create different weight functions that adhere to the user
specified constraints. Once these functions are specified correctly, we minimize it
across the set of assignments and return the solution that yields the lowest value.
Thus, the combination of equations 3.1 and 3.2 yield all the possible ways a current
user can optimize a given symmetric scheme. Further optimizations are future work.
Once the “best” solution is found, we have a CheckValidSplit procedure that verifies
that the conditions (1) and (2) of a “valid split” hold as defined in Definition 3.3.1. If
this solution satisfies these conditions, we are done. If not, we simply test the next
best solution, because the solver caches all solutions and we record metadata about
each solution in terms of efficiency and security.
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3.3.1.6 Step 6: Evaluate and Process the Solution
Once a split is chosen, AutoGroup+ must reconstruct SDL for the asymmetric
scheme and assumption(s). It reuses the functionality provided by AutoGroup to con-
struct the SDL as dictated by the split.8 To output the new asymmetric assumptions,
AutoGroup+ follows the logic of Abe et al. [44] (although they did not implement this
step) and implements a new procedure that uses the graph split to reconstruct the
asymmetric assumption(s). For each element in the asymmetric assumption, we learn
the new assignments of the elements using the graph split and mechanically generate
the asymmetric assumption SDL. Finally, we rely on existing tools [11, 12] to translate
the new asymmetric SDL representation into executable code for C++ or Python, or
simply LATEX.
3.3.2 Analysis of AutoGroup+
We analyze AutoGroup+’s security and optimizations.
Security. At a high-level, the Abe et al. [44] security argument works as follows. In
the Type-I setting, we treat G1 = G2 because there are efficient isomorphisms between
these two groups. However, suppose we work in the generic Type-I group model, where
elements are a black box and to compute this isomorphism, a party must utilize an
oracle O. Next, consider moving to a Type-III group, where every element (for which
the discrete logarithm is known with respect to the base generators) is duplicated; that
8We further perform an efficiency check on the final scheme as previously done in AutoGroup.
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is, for h = gx ∈ G, we have h1 = gx1 ∈ G1 and h2 = gx2 ∈ G2. Then in the generic Type-
III group model, we can simulate having efficiently computable isomorphisms between
these groups by exposing an oracle O′ that on input d1 ∈ G1 outputs d2 ∈ G2 (or vice
versa). In essence, by exposing the “corresponding" group element (through the oracle
in the Type-III setting), we “allow” all necessary isomorphism computations for the
scheme itself to operate, however, at the same time, we can argue that any adversary
that breaks this scheme (with these elements exposed) can be turned into an attacker
against the Type-I scheme, where these isomorphisms are natively computable. The
resulting theorem was summarized in Theorem 3.1.1: namely, the Type-III conversion
will be secure in the generic group model, if one follows the conversion criteria in [44]
and the Type-I input was secure in the generic group model.
Thus, we must argue that the AutoGroup+ implementation satisfies the criteria
in [44]. The dependency graphs are created and merged according to the same algo-
rithm. (AutoGroup+ tracks some additional information on the side for optimization
purposes.) What is required is that the splitting of the merged dependency graph
satisfies Abe et al.’s notion of a “valid split.”
Definition 3.3.1 (Valid Split [44]). Let Γ = (V,E) be a dependency graph for Π =
(S,R,A), a tuple representing a scheme, reduction and assumption(s) that are in the
set covered by the [44] translation. Let P = (p1[0], . . . , pn[1]) ⊂ V be pairing nodes.
A pair of graphs Γ0 = (V0, E0) and Γ1 = (V1, E1) is a valid split of Γ with respect to
NoDup ⊆ V if the following hold:
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1. merging Γ0 and Γ1 recovers Γ,
2. for each i ∈ {0, 1} and every X ∈ Vi\P , the ancestor subgraph of X in Γ is
included in Γi.
3. for each i ∈ {1, . . . , np} pairing nodes pi[0] and pi[1] are separately included in
V0 and V1,
4. No node in V0 ∩ V1 is included in NoDup. NoDup is a list of nodes that cannot
be assigned to both V0 and V1.
In terms of AutoGroup+ security, conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied in the search
procedure (step 5). That is, before we admit a split, we do these simple tests. Condition
(3) is satisfied by the SMT solver with the logical formula encoding of pairing nodes
(step 4). Condition (4) is also satisfied by the SMT solver (step 4). We encode the
output of hashes as constraints over the logical formula; specifically, we ask the solver
to find splits that keep hashes in G1. This is the only place we differ slightly. Abe
et al. allow G1 or G2 assignment for hashes but not both. Our approach prioritizes
solutions that preserve efficiency but we could give the user the option of relaxing this
to match Abe et al. The translation back to SDL is fairly straightforward from the
split.
Optimizations. In terms of optimality over the set of solutions admitted by the
“valid split” method, AutoGroup+ finds the “best” one by searching over the entire set.
It does this efficiently by turning the user-specified optimizations into the appropriate
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objective function and passing this function into the SMT solver. Our experiments
in Section 3.5 provide evidence that the tool is, indeed, finding the optimal solutions
over the space of valid translations.
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, we do not rule out the existence of even better
solutions that employ insights outside of this method (such as altering the construction
or adding “stronger” assumptions, such as SXDH.)
3.4 An Automation Example with BB-HIBE
In this section, we illustrate each phase of the AutoGroup+ implementation de-
scribed in Section 3.3 by showing the step-by-step translation of the Boneh-Boyen
hierarchical identity-based encryption [56] (or BB HIBE) scheme. We begin by re-
calling the scheme: an efficient HIBE scheme (with ℓ = 2) [57, §4.1] that is selective
identity secure based on the standard Decisional Bilinear-Diffie Hellman (DBDH)
assumption.
This scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt.
The Setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter and defines public keys (ID)
of depth ℓ as vectors of elements in Zℓp. We define ℓ = 2, thus the identity is comprised
of ID = (ID1, ID2) ∈ Z2p. The algorithm generates system parameters as follows. First,
select a random generator g ∈ G, a random α ∈ Zp, and sets g1 = gα. Then, pick
random h1, h2, g2 ∈ G. Set the master public parameters params = (g, g1, g2, h1, h2)
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and the master secret key msk = g2α.
The KeyGen algorithm takes as input an ID = (ID1, ID2) ∈ Zp2, picks random
r1, r2 ∈ Zp and outputs:
d1 = g2
α · (g1ID1 · h1)r1 · (g1ID2 · h2)r2 , d2 = gr1 , d3 = gr2
and the algorithm outputs dID = (d1, d2, d3)
The Encrypt algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, an identity ID and
a message M ∈ GT . To encrypt the message M under the public key ID = (ID1, ID2),
picks a random s ∈ Zp and computes:
C = (e(g1, g2)
s ·M, gs, (g1ID1 · h1)s, (g1ID2 · h2)s)
and the algorithm outputs C = (C1, C2, C3, C4).
The Decrypt algorithm takes as input a private key dID = (d1, d2, d3) and a ciphertext
C and computes M as:
M = C1 ·
e(C3, d2) · e(C4, d3)
e(C2, d1)
The scheme is based on the DBDH assumption.
Assumption 1 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman). Let g generate group G of prime
order p ∈ Θ(2λ) with mapping e : G × G → GT . For all p.p.t. adversaries A, the
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following probability is negligible in λ:
|1
2
− Pr[a, b, c← Zp, z ← {0, 1}, A = ga,
B = gb, C = gc, T0 = e(g, g)
abc, T1 ← GT ;
z′ ← A(g, A,B,C, Tz) : z = z′]|.
3.4.0.0.1 Step 1: Generating SDL Inputs
In order for AutoGroup+ to perform the translation, we first begin by transcribing
the scheme, reduction and the DBDH assumption into SDL. We provide the SDL
description of the above scheme, reduction and assumption in Appendix D. The reader
will notice that the SDL descriptions closely and concisely follow the paper counterpart.
This design is on purpose as to reduce the burden of transcribing these constructions
for AutoGroup+ users. Indeed, in our experience the most time consuming and tedious
part is in specifying the reductions accurately.
3.4.0.0.2 Step 2: Extracting the Dependencies
Once the SDLs have been generated along with the metadata and the user’s desired
optimization goal, the user can proceed with executing AutoGroup+ to begin deriving
the dependency graphs for each input file. AutoGroup+ programmatically extracts
the dependencies from the SDL descriptions starting with the assumption(s), then
the reduction(s) and finally, the scheme. The dependency graph diagrams for BB
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Figure 3.3: Dependency graph that merges Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt
algorithms in BB HIBE and generated by AutoGroup+. For brevity, we only show
the combined scheme graph and omit the smaller ones for each routine in the scheme.
Note that nodes P1 through P4 represent unique pairing identifiers, with a 0 index








Figure 3.4: Dependency graph for the reduction to DBDH in BB HIBE. This graph
was generated by AutoGroup+.
92
CHAPTER 3. TOOLS FOR DEVELOPING SECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SYSTEMS
HIBE [57, §4.1] are included in Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. Note that these diagrams
were generated automatically by our tool; we believe this feature provides more
transparency to make it easier for humans to verify that the software is operating
correctly. In “naming” the nodes of our dependency graphs, we closely follow the
naming conventions that the user employed in the SDL, thus supporting the quick
and easy verification.
3.4.0.0.3 Step 3: Merge the Graphs
In Figure 3.5, we show the third step in AutoGroup+ which is to merge the multiple



















Figure 3.5: The merged dependency graph for the assumption, reduction to DBDH,
and the BB HIBE scheme. This graph was generated by AutoGroup+.
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3.4.0.0.4 Step 4: Assignment of Variables
With the merged graph, we encode the pairing equations as a logical formula as
in AutoGroup but also encode certain group elements in the dependency graph as
additional constraints to the solver (with optimization requirements):
P1[0] ̸= P1[1] ∧ P2[0] ̸= P2[1] ∧ P3[0] ̸= P3[1] ∧ P4[0] ̸= P4[1]
Recall that pairing identifiers (e.g., P2[0], P2[1]) are unique references which refer to
pairing inputs from the scheme (e.g., e(C3, d2)).
3.4.0.0.5 Step 5: Search for an Optimal Solution
In our BB HIBE example, the goal is to minimize the number of splits in the master
public parameters params, so this requires specifying the following parameters of the
EvalGraph function. Let B = {g, g1, g2, h1, h2} be the set of elements in the public
parameters we wish to minimize and let G be an encoding of the merged dependency
graph shown in Figure 3.5. As reflected in Table 3.8, the solver identifies 16 possible
solutions for the BB HIBE scheme and computes the following on each solution as
Sj = EvalGraph(Aj, B,G) where Aj is the j-th set of possible variable assignments.
Recall that EvalGraph simply applies a given solution to G and records how elements
of B are assigned. From the set S, the solver finds an assignment that has the fewest
number of duplicated public key elements with the smallest overall size. Based on this
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criteria, the solver returned a optimal solution in the fifth step which consisted of 2
splits (i.e., two duplicated elements). The new public key elements are assigned as
B′ = {g, g̃, g1, g2, g̃2, h1, h2} ∈ G51 ×G22. This constitutes only an addition of 2 group
elements in G2.
3.4.0.0.6 Step 6: Assignment of Variables
In the last step, AutoGroup+ splits the graph as dictated by the optimal solution
found by the solver. The resulting graphs for G1 and G2 assignments for the BB HIBE
scheme are shown in Figure 3.6. AutoGroup+ programmatically converts the split
graph into an asymmetric translation for the scheme and assumption. We improve on
code from AutoGroup to do the former translation and write a new module to do the
latter (see Figure 3.7 for the graph split of co-DBDH). These resulting SDL files are
provided in Appendix D.2. As mentioned before, there is a publicly-available tool (see
Section 3.2.3) for automatically turning this SDL into C++, Python or LATEX.
3.5 AutoGroup+: Experimental Evaluation
We tested AutoGroup+ on 9 schemes, with 3-4 optimization options and 4 different
levels of BB HIBE, for 48 total translations.9 Figure 3.8 summarizes the translation
times and resulting scheme sizes.10 To demonstrate the improvement in running
9Currently the tool does not support the assumption minimization option for schemes with more
than one assumption. This is future work, although we would like to explore how valuable assumption
minimization is to tool users.
10We only give details for two variations of BB HIBE because the results are similar for all levels.
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(b) Showing G2 elements in the scheme
Figure 3.6: The dependency graphs for the asymmetric translation of BB HIBE scheme





Figure 3.7: The dependency graph for the co-DBDH assumption and generated by
AutoGroup+.
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Conversion Number of Group Elements Assumption Num.
Time Public Key Secret Key Ciphertext Assumption Solutions
ID-Based Enc.
BB04 HIBE [56, §4] Symmetric (l = 2) - G5 G3 G3 ×GT G4 ×GT DBDH
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 592 ms G51 ×G22 G1 ×G22 G21 ×G2 ×GT G41 ×G32 ×GT 16
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 641 ms G51 ×G42 G31 G32 ×GT G31 ×G32 ×GT 16
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 626 ms G41 ×G52 G32 G31 ×GT G31 ×G32 ×GT 16
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 582 ms G41 ×G52 G32 G31 ×GT G31 ×G32 ×GT 16
BB04 HIBE [56, §4] Symmetric (l = 9) - G12 G10 G10 ×GT G4 ×GT DBDH
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 20629 ms G121 ×G22 G1 ×G92 G91 ×G2 ×GT G41 ×G32 ×GT 2048
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 15714 ms G121 ×G112 G101 G102 ×GT G31 ×G32 ×GT 2048
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 15690 ms G111 ×G122 G102 G101 ×GT G31 ×G32 ×GT 2048
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 20904 ms G111 ×G122 G102 G101 ×GT G31 ×G32 ×GT 2048
GENTRY06 [58, §3.1] Symmetric - G3 Zp ×G G×G2T G3+q ×GT trunc. dec. q-ABDHE




















WATERS05 [54, §4] Symmetric - G4+n G2 G2 ×GT G4 ×GT DBDH
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 725 ms G4+n1 ×G22 G1 ×G2 G1 ×G2 ×GT G41 ×G32 ×GT 8
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 770 ms G4+n1 ×G3+n2 G21 G22 ×GT G31 ×G32 ×GT 8
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 767 ms G3+n1 ×G4+n2 G22 G21 ×GT G31 ×G32 ×GT 8
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 716 ms G4+n1 ×G3+n2 G21 G22 ×GT G31 ×G32 ×GT 8
WATERS09 (DSE) [52, §3.1] Symmetric - G13 ×GT G8 × Zp Zp ×G9 ×GT (G4 ×GT ), (G6), (G6) DBDH, DLIN, DLIN
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 6217 ms G101 ×G42 ×GT G41 ×G42 × Zp G51 ×G42 ×GT (G41 ×G32 ×GT ), (G61 ×G62) 256
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 5871 ms G71 ×G132 ×GT G81 × Zp G92 ×GT (G31 ×G32 ×GT ), (G61 ×G62), (G61 ×G62) 256
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 5858 ms G131 ×G72 ×GT G82 × Zp G91 ×GT (G31 ×G32 ×GT ), (G61 ×G62), (G61 ×G62) 256
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 6228 ms G121 ×G52 ×GT G31 ×G52 × Zp G61 ×G32 ×GT (G41 ×G22 ×GT ), (G61 ×G62), (G61 ×G62) 256
Broadcast Encryption
BGW05 [59, §3.1] Symmetric (n users) - G2n+1 G G3 G2l+1 ×GT decision l-BDHE
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 530 ms G2n+11 ×G2n2 G2 G21 ×GT G2l1 ×G2l+12 ×GT 4
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 601 ms G2n1 ×G2n+12 G1 G22 ×GT G2l1 ×G2l+12 ×GT 4
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 587 ms G2n+11 ×G2n2 G2 G21 ×GT G2l1 ×G2l+12 ×GT 4
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 544 ms G2n+11 ×G2n2 G2 G21 ×GT G2l1 ×G2l+12 ×GT 4
Signature
ACDKNO [60, §5.3] Symmetric - G15 G2 G8 (G4), (G6), (G6) CDH, DLIN, DLIN
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 18216 ms G141 ×G52 G22 G1 ×G72 (G21 ×G42), (G21 ×G62), (G21 ×G62) 1024
Asymmetric [Min. Sig] 14689 ms G61 ×G142 G21 G81 (G41 ×G22), (G61 ×G22), (G61 ×G22) 1024
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 18135 ms G51 ×G142 G21 G71 ×G2 (G41 ×G22), (G61 ×G22), (G61 ×G22) 1024
BLS [61, §2.2] Symmetric - G2 Z∗p G G4 CDH
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 515 ms G22 Z∗p G1 (G41 ×G32), (G31 ×G32), (G31 ×G32) 2
Asymmetric [Min. Sig] 556 ms G22 Z∗p G1 (G41 ×G32), (G31 ×G32), (G31 ×G32) 2
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 517 ms G22 Z∗p G1 (G41 ×G32), (G31 ×G22), (G31 ×G32) 2
CL04 [55, §3.1] Symmetric - G3 Z∗p
2 G3 G3 LRSW
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 278 ms G31 ×G2 Z∗p2 G32 G31 2
Asymmetric [Min. Sig] 328 ms G1 ×G32 Z∗p2 G31 G32 2
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 275 ms G31 ×G2 Z∗p2 G32 G31 2
WATERS05 [54, §7] Symmetric - G4+n G G2 G4 ×GT DBDH
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 724 ms G31 ×G2 G32 G1 ×G2 G41 ×G22 ×GT 8
Asymmetric [Min. Sig] 721 ms G4+n1 ×G3+n2 G1 G21 G31 ×G32 ×GT 8
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 755 ms G4+n1 ×G22 G1 G1 ×G2 G41 ×G22 ×GT 8
Figure 3.8: A summary of the experimental evaluations of AutoGroup+ on a variety
of schemes and optimization options. For the symmetric baseline with curve SS1536,
elements in G are 1536 bits and GT are 3072 bits. For the asymmetric translations
with BN256, elements in G1 are 256 bits, G2 are 1024 bits, and GT are 3072 bits. For
BGW05, the private key size is listed for a single user.
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Time•
Setup Keygen Encrypt/Sign Decrypt/Verify
ID-Based Enc.
BB04 HIBE [56, §4] Symmetric (SS1536) (l = 2) 346.47 ms 84.75 ms 118.64 ms 133.48 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] 5.09 ms 4.79 ms 12.92 ms 21.36 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. SK] 8.15 ms 2.95 ms 14.95 ms 21.32 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. CT] 9.84 ms 6.23 ms 12.38 ms 21.22 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] 9.08 ms 7.30 ms 12.27 ms 21.64 ms
BB04 HIBE [56, §4] Symmetric (SS1536) (l = 9) 892.69 ms 283.11 ms 217.39 ms 446.10 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] 9.25 ms 17.64 ms 17.10 ms 70.84 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. SK] 20.53 ms 11.14 ms 24.36 ms 71.45 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. CT] 21.60 ms 27.02 ms 16.48 ms 72.03 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] 21.68 ms 31.96 ms 16.77 ms 70.48 ms
GENTRY06 [58, §3.1] Symmetric (SS1536) 172.30 ms 28.23 ms 137.79 ms 48.42 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] 2.88 ms 2.47 ms 21.08 ms 10.01 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. SK] 4.22 ms 1.18 ms 22.46 ms 9.96 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. CT] 2.93 ms 2.53 ms 21.02 ms 10.02 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] 2.88 ms 2.53 ms 21.10 ms 10.09 ms
WATERS05 [54, §4] Symmetric (SS1536) 908.94 ms 29.78 ms 78.08 ms 111.76 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] 10.31 ms 2.04 ms 11.98 ms 14.23 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. SK] 24.11 ms 1.37 ms 13.68 ms 14.11 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. CT] 25.39 ms 3.67 ms 11.25 ms 14.23 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] 23.81 ms 1.36 ms 13.71 ms 14.38 ms
WATERS09 (DSE) [52, §3.1] Symmetric (SS1536) 755.50 ms 195.27 ms 212.88 ms 414.79 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] 23.13 ms 9.71 ms 13.70 ms 66.45 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. SK] 36.83 ms 7.07 ms 20.08 ms 66.42 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. CT] 34.41 ms 14.82 ms 11.08 ms 66.92 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] 29.90 ms 11.09 ms 13.03 ms 66.92 ms
Broadcast Encryption
BGW05 [59, §3.1] Symmetric (SS1536) (n = 10) 376.84 ms 140.27 ms 86.96 ms 68.65 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] 55.29 ms 13.98 ms 11.457 ms 6.13 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. SK] 38.45 ms 5.82 ms 12.49 ms 8.122 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. CT] 37.75 ms 12.32 ms 11.18 ms 6.27 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] 37.74 ms 12.31 ms 11.186 ms 6.12 ms
Signature
ACDKNO [60, §5.3] Symmetric (SS1536) 395.23 ms 497.04 ms 275.99 ms 937.14 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] 9.05 ms 17.19 ms 15.27 ms 147.62 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Sig] 8.31 ms 22.65 ms 14.33 ms 152.60 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] 8.43 ms 22.23 ms 13.94 ms 147.77 ms
BLS [61, §] Symmetric (SS1536) - 93.20 ms 92.61 ms 167.73 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] - 2.99 ms 0.74 ms 14.20 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Sig] - 3.00 ms 0.75 ms 14.20 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] - 3.03 ms 0.69 ms 14.18 ms
CL04 [55, §3.1] (SS1536) - 464.7 ms 178.18 ms 973.48 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] - 9.27 ms 15.12 ms 121.61 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Sig] - 14.54 ms 7.38 ms 119.16 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] - 11.53 ms 15.32 ms 124.19 ms
WATERS05 [54, §7] (SS1536) - 720.75 ms 29.72 ms 135.00 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. PK] - 10.42 ms 2.02 ms 21.44 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Sig] - 25.60 ms 1.43 ms 23.13 ms
Asymmetric (BN256) [Min. Assump] - 10.18 ms 2.01 ms 21.42 ms
•Average time measured over 100 test runs and the standard deviation in all test runs were within ±1% of the average.
Figure 3.9: A summary of the running times of the AutoGroup+ translations using
curve BN256 as compared to the running times using the roughly security-equivalent
symmetric curve SS1536 in MIRACL. The asymmetric setting plus AutoGroup+’s
optimizations cut the running times by one or two orders of magnitude.
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BB04 HIBE [56, §4] (l = 2) - -
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 592 ms 16
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 641 ms 16
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 626 ms 16
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 582 ms 16
BB04 HIBE [56, §4] (l = 6) - -
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 2361 ms 256
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 2019 ms 256
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 2023 ms 256
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 2375 ms 256
BB04 HIBE [56, §4] (l = 7) - -
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 4555 ms 512
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 3644 ms 512
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 3662 ms 512
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 4519 ms 512
BB04 HIBE [56, §4] (l = 8) - -
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 9344 ms 1024
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 7148 ms 1024
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 7194 ms 1024
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 9299 ms 1024
BB04 HIBE [56, §4] (l = 9) - -
Asymmetric [Min. PK] 20629 ms 2048
Asymmetric [Min. SK] 15714 ms 2048
Asymmetric [Min. CT] 15690 ms 2048
Asymmetric [Min. Assump] 20904 ms 2048
Figure 3.10: A summary of the conversion times of AutoGroup+ for various lev-
els/degrees of complexity of BB04 HIBE [56, §4] and a variety of optimization options.
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times due to both the asymmetric setting and AutoGroup+’s optimizations, Figure 3.9
includes over 140 timing experiments, showing drastic improvements. In Figure 3.10,
we summarize the effect of scheme complexity on AutoGroup+ conversion time by
varying the complexity of BB HIBE. We note that even given a more complex scheme
than attempted by any other tool, AutoGroup+ still provides fast conversion times.
System Configuration. All of our benchmarks were executed on a standard workstation
that has a 2.20GHz quad-core Intel Core i7-2720QM processor with 8GB RAM running
Ubuntu 11.04 LTS, Linux Kernel version 2.6.38-16-generic (x86-64-bit architecture).
Our measurements only use a single core of the Intel processor for consistency. The
AutoGroup+ implementation utilizes the same building blocks as AutoGroup which
include the MIRACL library (v5.5.4) and/or RELIC cryptographic toolkit [62], Charm
v0.43 [50] in C++ or Python code, and the Z3 SMT solver (v4.3.2).
Limitations. In Section 3.3.1.1, we provide an example of a scheme which falls into a
category of things that Abe et al. warned about and on which AutoGroup gets confused.
AutoGroup tries to power through and split the hash output (which it cannot really
do because the discrete log is unknown), so while it eventually outputs some SDL,
this SDL is not a proper translation. Unlike AutoGroup, AutoGroup+ includes logic to
output a warning when processing such inputs and continues trying to translate the
scheme. If the verification check of a valid split fails (e.g., due to hash split), then
AutoGroup+ identifies the split as invalid and attempts checking the next best solution.
If there are no such solutions, AutoGroup+ outputs no solution.
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3.5.1 Comparison with ACSC/Charm
Our experiments have five schemes in common with public implementations in the
Advanced Crypto Software Collection [49] and Charm [50]. Where we have matches,
our new results confirm the security and optimality of those (unproven) implemented
translations.
For Waters 2009 [52], we compare with the Charm implementation by Fan Zhang.
For our PK-size optimization, our translation is 3 elements shorter (we split only g,
whereas they split g, w, u, h.) For our ciphertext-size optimization, it looks the closest
to theirs, but they do not match. Both translations have short ciphertexts leaving
all base elements in G1. However, the Charm translation appears to have shifted
some elements from the public key to the secret key and dropped some elements from
the master secret key (e.g., we split v and include both in the MSK, because that is
the naive way to do it, but they use the v split for G1 only in the Setup and then
drop it from the MSK.) While we cannot confirm the security of this implementation
using our tool (so we believe this is left as an open question), the tool did produce a
translation with the same ciphertext-size that is secure.
For BGW 2005 [59], we compared with the C implementation on the ACSC website
by Matt Steiner and Ben Lynn. Indeed, our translations that minimize the public
parameters or ciphertext size are the same, and the same as their manual translation.
We confirm security and PP/ciphertext-size optimality.
For BB HIBE [56], Charm has a full HIBE implementation. We tested it for a
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minimum of 2 levels, but their implementation matches ours for ciphertext minimiza-
tion, except that they add a precomputed pairing (element in GT ) to the public key
so that it does not have to be done per encryption. This impacts only efficiency. We
confirm security and ciphertext-size optimality.
For CL [55], we can confirm that the Charm implementation is secure and public-
key-size optimal. However, in the more likely event that one wants to minimize
signature size, AutoGroup+ found a translation with a shorter signature.
For BLS [61], our translations also match. This is a simple case with only two
translation options.
Charm [50] also includes variants of the Waters encryption and signature schemes [54]
from 2005, but we translated the original schemes (as did [12, 44]), so our translations
are not directly comparable to these Charm variants.
3.5.2 Comparison with Abe et al.
Abe et al. [44] tested their method on two encryption schemes: Waters 2005 [54]
and Waters 2009 (Dual System Encryption) [52]. They looked at minimizing the
size of the public key and the Type-III assumption. We conjecture that practitioners
would be more interested in minimizing ciphertext or private key size, so our summary
also includes those optimizations.
For Waters 2005, AutoGroup+ found the same construction as their semi-automated
method. As remarked in Section 3.3.1.1, their dependency graph for this scheme
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included some unnecessary dependencies. Waters [54] clearly states to choose g2, u′, ui
as fresh random generators, but Abe et al. explicitly “assume” that they are generated
from a common generator g. From a functionality and security standpoint of the
Type-I scheme, this distinction certainly does not matter. However, it does change the
intermediate dependency graphs, which could in some cases affect the output (though
it does not in this situation). Both their partial automation and our full automation
of Waters 2005 took under one second.
For Waters 2009, AutoGroup+ first appeared to find a PK-optimized construction
with one less group element than the PK-optimized construction of Abe et al. [44].
However, subsequent discussions [51] determined that this was merely the product of
a different counting method; the numbers reported in this work are the correct ones
for both AutoGroup+and the Abe et al. method.
In the original work [44], no schemes with interactive assumptions were reported
on. In subsequent communcations [51], Abe et al. demonstrated a translation for the
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures [55] based on the interactive LSRW assumption.
We derived the SDL files for the scheme, assumption and proof and ran it through
AutoGroup+. The results matched.
Drawing and merging the dependency graphs by hand is tedious and becomes
infeasible for a complex scheme like [60]. In addition, the Abe et al. graph splitting
program took 1.75 hours for Waters09, whereas our tool handled everything in 6.5
seconds. Thus, we find that it is considerably easier and faster to transcribe the SDL
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and use AutoGroup+.
3.5.3 Comparison with AutoGroup
The AutoGroup tool [12] was used as the starting point for our implementa-
tion, hence the name of AutoGroup+. Our 48 translation experiments overlap with
AutoGroup in 14 points (seven schemes in common and they do fewer optimizations).
For these 14, the tools found the same constructions. However, a major difference is
that with AutoGroup+, we have security guarantees. This required us to write new
SDL descriptions for all the assumptions and proofs involved.
Indeed, one crucial question was how the security logic would increase translation
times. We focused our effort on leveraging an SMT Solver to help handle this security
logic, which kept the running times of AutoGroup+ within a few seconds of AutoGroup.
In addition to the security logic we added, we also found that the public key
optimization flag for encryption was not implemented. Because we wanted to compare
our results with [44], we implemented it.
AutoGroup was tested on one signature scheme omitted here. Boneh-Boyen [63]
has a nested proof structure that falls outside of the black box reductions considered
in this work.
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3.5.4 Comparison with manual translations
The Dual System Encryption scheme of Waters [52] has a few manual translations
with a security analysis. Ramanna, Chatterjee and Sarkar [46] provide a variety of
translations, one with the smallest public parameter/key size, at the cost of introducing
some mild complexity assumptions. Similarly, Chen, Lim, Ling, Wang and Wee [47]
presented a translation introducing the SXDH assumption, which achieved the shortest
ciphertext size. These results are superior to those derived by AutoGroup+ and [12, 44],
but it is not yet clear how to generalize and systematize the human creativity used.
3.6 Conclusions
Automation is the future for many cryptographic design tasks. This work success-
fully demonstrates automating a complex translation of a scheme from one algebraic
setting to another. There was a demonstrated need for such a compiler both for pairing
designers and implementors. Its realization combined and improved on contributions
from the systems [12] and theory [44] communities. The result is a practical tool,
AutoGroup+, that enables secure pairing translations for everyone.
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Chapter 4
New Domains for Cryptographic
Applications
This chapter is based on joint work with Matthew Green and Ian Miers at Johns
Hopkins University. The paper was originally published in Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2013, ISOC [18], while the complete version that
appears in this chapter was published at [64].
One of the barriers to the deployment of certain cryptographic schemes is often the
need to have a trusted party for some part of them, whether it is setup or part of the
actual execution of the scheme. These parties inherently require our trust, which we
might not want to give them, and provide a large target for compromise, which might
not always be detectable. In this chapter, we will discuss how to leverage a public,
append-only ledger, like Bitcoin’s blockchain, to remove the need for a trusted third
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party in anonymous credentials schemes. These “decentralized” anonymous credentials
are able to operate without a trusted credential issuer, allowing them to be practically
deployed in a variety of settings.
4.1 Introduction
Traditionally, making statements about identity on the Internet, whether actual
assertions of identity (“I am Spartacus”) or about one’s identity (“I am a gladiator”)
involves centralized providers who issue a credential attesting to that verification.
These organizations, which include Certificate Authorities, DNS maintainers, or login
providers like Google and Facebook, play a large role in securing internet infrastructure,
email, and financial transactions. Our increasing reliance on these providers raises
concerns about privacy and trust.
Anonymous credentials, introduced by Chaum [65] and developed in a line of
subsequent works [66, 67, 68, 69, 70], represent a powerful solution to this privacy
concern: they deprive even colluding credential issuers and verifiers of the ability to
identify and track their users. Although credentials may involve direct assertions of
identity, they may also be used for a large range of useful assertions, such as “my
TPM says my computer is secure,” “I have a valid subscription for content,” “I have a
certain reputation,” or “I am eligible to vote.”
Indeed, anonymous credentials have already seen several practical applications. The
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most widely deployed example is the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) portion
of the Trusted Platform Module specification [71, 72]. DAA extends the standard
attestation capabilities of the Trusted Platform Module to allow for anonymous
attestations of TPM state and to admit pseudonyms that are cryptographically bound
to the TPM’s internal identity certificate.
Unfortunately, current anonymous credential systems such as DAA have a fun-
damental limitation: while identity certification itself can be performed by a variety
of centralized and decentralized processes, all existing anonymous credential systems
employ blind signatures and thus require the appointment of a central, trusted party
to issue the credentials. This issuer represents a single point of failure and its signing
key an obvious target for compromise, either of which can seriously damage the
reliability of the credential system. Moreover, compromise or issuer malfeasance can
be particularly difficult to detect in an anonymous credential system. As a result, in
distributed settings such as ad hoc or peer-to-peer networks, it may be challenging to
identify parties who can be trusted to play this critical role or verify that the trust is
well placed. The ability to remove this trusted party or even verify their continued
good behavior is a distinct advantage.
These challenges raise two questions: 1) is it possible to build practical anonymous
credential systems where the process of issuing credentials — if not the establishment
of identity itself — no longer depends on a trusted party? And 2) is it possible to do
so without the need for a central party?
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Our contribution. In this chapter we answer both questions in the affirmative,
proposing a new technique for constructing anonymous credentials which does not rely
on the continued integrity of signature keys. A consequence of this result is that our
anonymous credential system can be instantiated on-demand and operated by an ad
hoc group of mistrustful peers. We further show how to extend our credential scheme
to create updatable (e.g., stateful) anonymous credentials in which users obtain new
credentials based on changing properties of their identity.
As a basic ingredient, our protocols require the existence of a public append-only
ledger. When the ledger is implemented using trusted hardware, or a central party
who is audited by the rest of the network, we obtain a positive answer only to the
first question. To answer both questions in the affirmative we require that 1) this
ledger be maintained in a distributed manner that need not require a trusted party or
parties and 2) the identity claims we are issuing credentials on must be verifiable by
everyone participating in the system. We refer to this new primitive as a decentralized
anonymous credential system and elaborate on its properties herein. We note that
one promising instantiation of a decentralized ledger is the “block chain” construction
used by Bitcoin [73] to implement a decentralized digital currency. Not only can this
technology be used to actually construct a separate distributed ledger for identities,
but using existing techniques for embedding small amounts of data in the block
chain [74] we can leverage Bitcoin’s existing ledger and protocol without modification
to transform any reliable storage mechanism (whether a central server or a distributed
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mechanism like a DHT) into an append-only ledger.
We show that our techniques have several immediate applications. They include:
• Decentralized Direct Anonymous Attestation. We show how to decen-
tralize the Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol [71], allowing individual col-
lections of nodes in an ad hoc or distributed system to securely assert properties
of their system state. We provide an exemplary description of our decentralized
(dDAA) construction.
• Anonymous resource management in ad hoc networks. Peer-to-peer
networks are vulnerable to impersonation attacks, where a single party simulates
many different peers in order to gain advantage against the network [75]. We
show that our credentials may be useful in mitigating these attacks. The basic
approach is to construct an anonymous subscription service [76, 77, 78] where
parties may establish unique or costly pseudonyms (for example by submitting a
valid TPM credential or paying a sum of digital currency). They can then assert
possession on their identity under a specific set of restrictions, e.g., a limit to
the number of requests they can make in each time period.
• Auditable credentials. Our techniques may also be used to extend existing
centralized credential systems by allowing for public audit of issued credentials.
This helps to guard against compromised credential issuers and allows the network
to easily detect and revoke inappropriate credential grants. For example, in
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Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) one might want to prevent a malicious
DAA authority from covertly granting certificates to users who do not have a
TPM or whose TPM did not attest.
Is decentralized credential issuance valuable? Before proceeding to describe our proto-
cols, it is worth asking whether decentralizing the issuance of anonymous credentials
is a useful goal at all. After all, identity credentialing is frequently a centralized
process. One might ask: what do we gain by decentralizing the issuance of anonymous
credentials?
A first response to this question is that most anonymous credential systems
separate the process of issuing anonymous credentials from the process of certifying
the underlying identity claims. Frequently, the claims being certified are publicly
verifiable. For example, each TPM ships with an Endorsement Key (EK). Identity
assertions using the EK could be publicly verifiable merely by checking the certificate
chain on the EK certificate and engaging in a challenge/response protocol to ensure
the TPM can read nonces encrypted to the EK.1 The problem is that transactions
conducted using this certificate are linked to the particular TPM device.
DAA solves this issue by having a central party issue new anonymous credentials to
a device. Organizations must configure a local server to validate identity certifications
and issue the corresponding anonymous credential. All this server does is transform a
publicly verifiable identity assertion into an anonymous one. This adds a cumbersome
1Conceptually the TPM’s EK can sign a statement and forgo any interactive issuing process. The
TPM 1.1 spec places an arbitrary restriction against using the EK RSA key for signing.
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step to the anonymous attestation system and also introduces a point of failure. Indeed,
this pattern of a trusted party transforming existing credentials into an anonymous
credential repeats in many settings. Allowing for the distributed issue of anonymous
credentials, even if they can only certify centrally validated assertions, removes this
additional point of trust.
An obvious question is why, if the identity assertion is publicly verifiable, do we
need any transformation mechanism at all? Why not present the information we
used to convince the authority to issue the credential to everyone? The issue is that
proving an identity statement may reveal far more information than the statement
itself. For example, a driver’s license can prove to anyone that the bearer is over
21 but also reveals a whole host of other information that the statement that “some
trusted mechanism says I am over 21” does not. Because anonymous credentials add a
layer of indirection between certifying that an identity statement is true and actually
showing that statement, they fix this issue and avoid linking any use of the credential
to the information used to issue it.
A more interesting question is whether identity certification itself can be decentral-
ized. At least for certain claims, this seems like a promising direction. For example,
non–extended validation SSL certificates are simply an assertion that the bearer
controls the specified domain.2 Similarly, DNS names are generally an assertion that
the owner was the first to register that name and wants it mapped to certain values
2In practice, CA’s usually verify that the bearer controls some administrator email such as
admin@domain or webmaster@domain.
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(e.g., an IP address). In both cases, since these claims are publicly verifiable by simple
criteria, a distributed set of entities can easily validate these claims for themselves.
In fact, a now largely unused fork of Bitcoin, Namecoin [79], shows that such
modifications are readily achievable. Namecoin uses Bitcoin’s append-only ledger
mechanism to maintain such first-come first-serve name-value mappings. Individuals
register a name and an owning public key. Provided they are the first to register that
name, they can make arbitrary updates to the associated value by signing them with the
registered key. A DNS system built atop this — DotBIT — is already in experimental
deployment. Namecoin can also be used to maintain mappings from names to public
keys. One could imagine more complex semantics for allowing name registration —
e.g., proofs of work, proofs of payment, TPM attestations, publicly verifiable proofs of
storage and retrievability of files [80] — supporting more sophisticated functionality
than simple DNS.
4.1.1 Overview of Our Construction
We now provide a brief overview for our construction, which is inspired by the
electronic cash proposals of Sander and Ta-Shma [81] and Miers et al. [82].
Issuing and showing credentials. The ability to establish identities and bind them
to a public key ensures that users can assert their identity in a non-anonymous fashion,
simply by issuing signatures from the corresponding secret key. Unfortunately, this does
not immediately show us how to construct anonymous credentials, since traditional
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anonymous credentials consist of a signature computed by a credential issuer. Since
no central party exists to compute the credential signature, this approach does not
seem feasible without elaborate (and inefficient) use of threshold cryptography.3
We instead take a different approach. To issue a new credential in our decentralized
system, the user establishes an identity and related attributes as described above.
She then attaches a vector commitment to her secret key skU along with the identity
and attribute strings that are contained within her identity assertion. Finally, she
includes a non-interactive proof that the credential is correctly constructed, i.e., that
the attributes in the commitment correspond to those revealed in the identity assertion.
The network will accept the identity assertion if and only if the assertion is considered
correct and the attached proof is valid.
At a later point an individual can prove possession of such a credential by proving
the following two statements in zero-knowledge:
1. She knows a commitment Ci in the set (C1, . . . , CN ) of all credentials previously
accepted to the block chain.
2. She knows the opening (randomness) for the commitment.
In addition to this proof, the user may simultaneously prove additional statements
about the identity and attributes contained within the commitment Ci. The challenge
in the above construction is to efficiently prove statements (1) and (2), i.e., without
3A possibility is to use ring signatures [83], which do not require a single trusted signer. Un-
fortunately, these signatures grow with the number of participating signers and require expensive
communication to generate.
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producing a proof that scales with N . Our solution, which adapts techniques from
distributed e-cash systems [82], circumvents this problem by using an efficient publicly-
verifiable accumulator [69] to gather the set of all previous commitments together.
Using this accumulator in combination with an efficient membership proof due to
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [84], we are able to reduce the size of this proof to O(λ)
for security parameter λ, rather than the O(N · λ) proofs that would result from a
naive OR proof.
Of course, merely applying these techniques does not lead to a practical credential
system. A key contribution of this work is to supply a concrete instantiation of the
above idea under well-studied assumptions and to prove that our construction provides
for consistency of credentials (ensuring multiple users cannot pool their credentials),
the establishment of pseudonyms, and a long set of extensions built upon anonymous
credentials. Last but not least, we need to formally define and prove the security of a
distributed anonymous credential scheme and provide some model for the distributed
ledger. Our instantiation requires a single trusted setup phase, after which the trusted
party is no longer required.4
4.1.2 Outline of This Chapter
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we
discuss how to get a distributed bulletin board. In §4.3 we discuss specific applications
4In §4.7 we discuss techniques for removing this trusted setup requirement.
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for decentralized anonymous credentials and argue that these systems can be used
to solve a variety of problems in peer-to-peer networks. In §4.4 we define the notion
of a decentralized anonymous credential scheme and provide an ideal-world security
definition. In §4.5 we describe the cryptographic building blocks of our construction,
and in §4.6 we provide an overview of our basic construction as well as a specific
instantiation based on the Discrete Logarithm and Strong RSA assumptions. In
§4.7 we extend our basic construction to add a variety of useful features, including
k-show credentials, stateful credentials, and credentials with hidden attributes. In
§4.8 we describe the implementation and performance of a prototype library realizing
our credential system. Finally, in §4.9, we show how to use our library to build a
distributed version of anonymous attestation.
4.2 Real-World Bulletin Boards and Decen-
tralized Bulletin Boards
A core component of our system is an append-only bulletin board we can use
to post issued credentials. The board must provide two strong security guarantees:
(1) that credentials must not be tampered with once added to the board and (2) all
parties will share a consistent view of the board. For the distributed instantiation we
additionally require (3) no party can control the addition of credentials to the board.
We detail ways to achieve both distributed and centralized versions of such a bulletin
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board here.
4.2.1 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a distributed currency system [73], which has grown since 2009 to
handle between $2–$5 million USD/day in transaction volume in a highly adversarial
environment. The heart of Bitcoin is the block chain, which serves as an append-only
bulletin board maintained in a distributed fashion by the Bitcoin peers. The block
chain consists of a series of blocks connected in a hash chain.5 Every Bitcoin block
memorializes a set of transactions (containing an amount of bitcoin, a sender, and a
recipient) that are collected from the Bitcoin broadcast network. Thus the network
maintains a consensus about what transactions have occurred and how much money
each user has.
Bitcoin peers, who are free to enter and leave the network, compete to generate
the next block by trying to calculate H(block || nonce) < t where H is a secure hash
function and t is an adjustable parameter. This process is known as mining, and the
difficulty level t is adjusted so that a block is created on average every 10 minutes.
When a block is generated, it is broadcast to the network and, if valid, accepted as
the next entry in the block chain. Bitcoin and related systems provide two incentives
to miners: (1) mining a block (i.e., completing the proof of work) entitles them to a
reward6 and (2) nodes can collect fees from every transaction in a block they mine.
5For efficiency reasons, the hash chain is actually a Merkle Tree.
6For Bitcoin this reward is set at 25 BTC but will eventually diminish and be eliminated.
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While Bitcoin uses the hash chain for the specific purpose of implementing an
electronic currency, the usefulness of the Bitcoin bulletin board has already been
recognized by several related applications. One spinoff of the Bitcoin concept is
Namecoin [79], a fork of Bitcoin that uses the block chain to maintain key–value
mappings. Namecoin is currently being used to implement an experimental DNS
replacement, dotBIT [85]. Users pay a small fee to register a key–value pair along
with a controlling public key. They can then make updates to the pair provided (1)
the updates are signed by that key and (2) if necessary, they pay a transaction fee.7
Due to this flexibility we use the Namecoin software in our implementations, but we
stress that the same techniques can be used with nearly any hash chain based network,
including mature deployments such as Bitcoin.
Because of the way Bitcoin’s block chain is constructed, recently added blocks
maybe be removed, and, more importantly, it is possible to introduce short-term forks
in the block chain that could be used to convince a single party that a poisoned-pill
credential was issued and hence identify them (see §4.4.3 for more details). One
solution, which is commonly used in Bitcoin, is to wait until a block has several blocks
on top of it (known as confirmations) before using it. Typically, waiting six blocks, or
roughly 60 minutes, is sufficient. Of course, peers are free to show credentials based
off blocks sooner than that as doing so does not make the show less secure. However
it comes at an increased privacy risk.
7Currently, neither Namecoin nor Bitcoin require significant transaction fees.
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4.2.2 A Central Ledger
An alternative to using Bitcoin’s block chain technology is to simply use a central
service to maintain an append-only ledger. This service must be trusted to give a
consistent view of the credential ledger to all parties. The most effective way to do
this is with trusted hardware (e.g., TPM attestations) that ensures that (1) the list is
append only and (2) the same version of the list is shown to everyone for a given time
period.
For lower security systems, it may be possible to simply run a service that signs the
list and have users audit the system by periodically comparing the list they received.
Similar mechanisms exist for auditing SSL authorities (e.g., Google’s Certificate
Transparency project). Tampering would not only be readily apparent but, due to the
signature on the list, provable. This, however, only acts as a deterrent to tampering
as it would not be detected until the next such comparison. As such tampering can
identify users when they authenticate, we only recommend this approach when either
the consequences of such a privacy breach are low or loss of reputation to an authority
when its malfeasance is subsequently detected is prohibitively high.
4.2.3 A Hybrid Approach
A third approach is to use some reliable storage mechanism (e.g., a central server
or a robust DHT) to store credential requests and insert checkpoints into Bitcoin’s
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actual block chain to ensure the ledger is append only. This can be done without any
modification to Bitcoin. We can achieve this by periodically (e.g., every 10 minutes)
inserting the digest of the ledger into the Bitcoin block chain. One way to accomplish
this is by using CommitCoin [74] which encodes information into the keys used for
transactions without destroying funds.8
Our one last technical challenge is to actually mark these transactions as checkpoints
for anyone to see. To accomplish this we propose leveraging multi–sig transactions9
where one key encodes the checkpoint with CommitCoin’s techniques and another is a
marker address that designates a checkpoint. For a distributed storage service, this
requires that the network elect a node or set of nodes to hold the marker key and
insert checkpoints and elect a new set of nodes with a fresh marker if the current set
either fails to insert checkpoints or inserts too many (either case is a denial of service
attack and will not compromise the integrity or anonymity of credentials).
4.3 Applications
In this section we discuss several of the applications facilitated by decentralized
anonymous credentials. While we believe that these credential systems may have
applications in a variety of environments, we focus specifically on settings where
trusting a central credential issuer is not an option or where issued credentials must
8The naive approach replaces the public key specifying the recipient with the hash of the data,
making it impossible to retrieve the funds. CommitCoin fixes this.
9Transactions that require signatures from multiple parties to redeem.
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be publicly audited.
Mitigating Sybil attacks in ad hoc networks. Impersonation attacks can have
grave consequences for both the security and resource allocation capabilities of ad
hoc networks. A variety of solutions have been proposed to address this problem.
One common approach is to require that clients solve computational puzzles [86]. For
example, for a challenge c and a difficulty target t, find a nonce n such that H(c||n) < t.
Solving such a puzzle takes a meaningful amount of effort — thus deterring Sybil
attacks — and, as anyone can hash n and c, is publicly verifiable. For a centralized
service, this proof can be done once per client on registration. In a peer-to-peer
system, however, far more complex mechanisms are needed to avoid having to provide
a proof of work per each pair of interacting peers [86]. We stress that the issue with
distributed approaches is not the lack of publicly verifiable puzzles but the number of
puzzles and who they are sent to. This is even more difficult if we require the system
to be anonymous.
Our solution to this problem is to use k-show anonymous credentials. In this
approach, peers establish a single credential by solving a proof of work (similar to
using a central service). This allows the peer to obtain a credential that can be used
a limited number of times or a limited number of times within a given time period.
When a peer exceeds the k-use threshold (e.g., by cloning the credential for a Sybil
attack), the credential can be identified and revoked. We note that this proposal is
a distributed variant of the anonymous subscription service concept, which was first
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explored by Damgård et al. [76] and Camenisch et al. [77].
Managing resource usage. In networks where peers both contribute and consume
resources, ensuring fair resource utilization can be challenging. For example, a storage
network might wish to ensure peers provide as much storage as they consume [87]
or ensure that peers fairly use network bandwith [88]. This can be problematic in
networks that provide anonymity services (e.g., Tor), where peers may be reluctant to
identify which traffic they originated. An anonymous credential system allows peers to
identify their contributions to routing traffic in exchange for a credential which they
can then use to originate traffic. Of course, we are restricted to issuing credentials on
metrics which peers can publicly establish. Thankfully this is a fairly expressive set.
Eigenspeed [89] allows peer-to-peer networks to form accurate bandwidth estimates
for all peers even in the presence of active attackers. Similarly, there exist publicly
verifiable proofs of retrievability that can be used to verify storage of a file [80]. Both
of these are effective metrics for resource management.
4.4 Decentralized Anonymous Credentials
A traditional anonymous credential system has two types of participants: users and
organizations. Users, who each have a secret key skU , are known by pseudonyms both
to each other and organizations. NymOA, for example, is the pseudonym of user A to
organization O. Decentralized anonymous credentials have no single party representing
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the organization. Instead, this party is replaced with a quorum of users who enforce a
specific credential issuing policy and collaboratively maintain a list of credentials thus
far issued. For consistency with prior work, we retain the term “organization” for this
group.
A distributed anonymous credential system consists of a global transaction ledger, a set
of transaction semantics, as well as the following (possibly probabilistic) algorithms:
• Setup(1λ)→ params. Generates the system parameters.
• KeyGen(params)→ skU . Run by a user to generate her secret key.
• FormNym(params,U , E, skU) → (NymEU , skNymEU ). Run by a user to generate
a pseudonym NymEU and an authentication key skNymEU between a user U and
some entity (either a user or an organization) E.
• MintCred(params, skU , NymOU , skNymOU , attrs, aux) → (c, skc, πM). Run by a
user to generate a request for a credential from organization O. The request
consists of a candidate credential c containing public attributes attrs; the user’s
key skU ; auxiliary data aux justifying the granting of the credential; and a proof
πM that (1) NymOU was issued to the same skU and (2) the credential embeds
attrs.
• MintVerify(params, c,NymOU , aux, πM)→ {0, 1}. Run by nodes in the organiza-
tion to validate a credential. Returns 1 if πM is valid, 0 otherwise.
124
CHAPTER 4. NEW DOMAINS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATIONS
• RegNym(NymOU ,U , O): U logs into TP with skU to register a nym with organization O.
If she does not have an account, she first creates one. She gives TP a unique random string
NymOU for use as her nym with O. TP checks that the string is indeed unique and if so
stores (NymOU ,U , O) and informs U .
• MintCred(NymOU , O, attrs, aux): U logs into TP authenticating with skU . If NymOU is not
U ’s nym with O or skU is wrong, reject. Otherwise, TP checks that aux justifies issuing a
credential under O’s issuing policy and if so generates a unique random id id and stores
(NymOU ,U , id , attrs). It then adds id to its public list of issued credentials for O.
• ShowOnNym(NymOU ,NymVU , O, V, attrs,C): U logs into TP with skU . If NymOU is not
U ’s nym with O or NymVU is not U ’s nym with V , reject. Else, TP checks if the tuple
(NymOU ,U) exists, if id associated with that tuple is in the set of credentials C that U
provided, and if the given attributes attrs match the attributes associated with that tuple.
If all conditions hold, TP informs V that NymVU has a credential from O in the set C. V
then retrieves the set of credentials CO issued by O from TP and accepts TP ’s assertion if
and only if C ⊆ CO and O’s issuing policy is valid ∀c′ ∈ CO.
• GetCredList(O): TP retrieves the list of credentials for organization O and returns it.
Figure 4.1: Ideal Functionality. Security of a basic distributed anonymous credential
system.
• Show(params, skU ,NymVU , skNymVU , c, skc,CO) → πS. Run by a user to non-
interactively prove that a given set of attributes are in a credential c in the set
of issued credentials CO and that c was issued to the same person who owns
NymVU . Generates and returns a proof πS.
• ShowVerify(params,NymVU , πS,CO) → {0, 1}. Run by a verifier to validate a
shown credential. Return 1 if πS is valid for NymVU , 0 otherwise.
We now describe how these algorithms are used in the context of an anonymous
credential system.
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4.4.1 Overview of the Protocol Semantics
To realize the full anonymous credential system, we integrate the above algorithms
with a decentralized hash chain based bulletin board as follows. We assume a bulletin
board such as Namecoin that provides a means for storing arbitrary key–value pairs.10
We provide a concrete realization of our protocols in §4.6 and §4.8.
Formulating a pseudonym. Prior to requesting a new credential, the user executes
the KeyGen algorithm to obtain skU and then runs the FormNym algorithm to obtain
a pseudonym for use with this organization. This requires no interaction with the
bulletin board, hence the user can perform these actions offline.
Obtaining a credential. To obtain a credential, the user places the organization name
and some public identity assertion — for example, a TPM attestation and AIK
certificate chain — into the auxiliary data field aux, then executes the MintCred
routine to obtain a credential and a signature of knowledge on that information. She
then formulates a transaction including both the resulting credential and the auxiliary
data and broadcasts it into the hash chain network, along with (optionally) some sum
of digital currency to pay for the transaction fees. She retains the secret portion of
the credential.
Once received by the network, all parties can verify the correctness of the cre-
dential and the identity assertion using the MintVerify routine and whatever external
10While this functionality is supported by default in Namecoin, it is also possible to store arbitrary
data in existing block chains such as the Bitcoin chain.
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procedures are needed to verify the auxiliary data. This process can be conducted
directly by the network nodes, or it can be validated after the fact by individual
credential verifiers.
Showing a credential. When a user wishes to show a credential to some Verifier, she
first scans through the bulletin board to obtain a set CO consisting of all candidate
credentials belonging to a specific organization. She next verifies each credential using
the MintVerify routine (if she has not already done so) and validates the auxiliary
identity certification information. She then runs the Show algorithm to generate a
credential, which she transmits directly to the Verifier. The Verifier also collects the
set of credentials in CO and validates the credential using the ShowVerify routine. She
accepts the credential certification if this routine outputs 1.
4.4.2 Security
We define our system in terms of an ideal functionality implemented by a trusted
party TP that plays the role that our cryptographic constructions play in the real
system. All communication takes place through this ideal trusted party. Security and
correctness for our system comes from a proof that this ideal model is indistinguish-
able from the real model provided the cryptographic assumptions hold. Our ideal
functionality is outlined in Figure 4.1.
It consists of organizations who issue credentials and users who both prove that
they have these credentials and verify such proofs. Organizations have only two things:
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1) an efficient and publicly evaluable policy, policyO, for granting credentials and 2) an
append-only list of credentials meeting that policy maintained by the trusted party.
4.4.3 Trusting the Ledger
An obvious question is whether the append-only transaction ledger is necessary at
all. Indeed, if the list of valid credentials can be evaluated by a set of untrusted nodes,
then it seems that a user (Prover) could simply maintain a credential list compiled
from network broadcasts and provide this list to the Verifier during a credential show.
However, this approach can enable sophisticated attacks where a malicious Verifier
manipulates the Prover’s view of the network to include a poisoned-pill credential that
— although valid by the issuing heuristic — was not broadcast to anyone else. When
the Prover authenticates, she has completely identified herself.
The distributed transaction ledgers employed by networks such as Bitcoin and
Namecoin provide a solution to this problem, as their primary purpose is to ensure a
shared view among a large number of nodes in an adversarial network. In practice this
is accomplished by maintaining a high degree of network connectivity and employing
computational proofs of work to compute a hash chain.
For an attacker to execute the poisoned credential attack against such a ledger,
she would need to both generate and maintain a false view of the network to delude
the Prover. This entails both simulating the Prover’s view of the rest of the network
complete with all its computational power and forging any assurances the Prover might
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expect from known peers about the present state of the network. If the Prover has a
reasonable estimate of the actual network’s power (e.g., she assumes it monotonically
increases), then an attacker must actually have equivalent computational power to
the entirety of the network to mount such an attack. For the purposes of this paper
we assume such active attacks are impossible even if the attacker controls a simple
majority of the computational power. Attackers are still free to attempt any and all
methods of retroactively identifying a user and mount any other active attacks.
4.5 Preliminaries
We make use of the following complexity assumptions and cryptographic building
blocks to construct our scheme.
4.5.1 Complexity Assumptions
The security of our scheme relies on the following two complexity assumptions:
Strong RSA Assumption [90, 91]. Given a randomly generated RSA modulus n
and a random element y ∈ Z∗n, it is hard to compute x ∈ Z∗n and integer exponent
e > 1 such that xe ≡ y mod n. We can restrict the RSA modulus to those of the form
pq, where p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 are safe primes.
Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption [92]. Let G be a cyclic group with
generator g. Given h ∈ G, it is hard to compute x such that h = gx.
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4.5.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks
Zero-knowledge proofs. In a zero-knowledge protocol [93] a user (the prover)
proves a statement to another party (the verifier) without revealing anything about
the statement other than that it is true. Our constructions use zero-knowledge proofs
that can be instantiated using the technique of Schnorr [94], with extensions due to,
e.g., [95, 96, 97, 98]. We convert these into non-interactive proofs by applying the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic [99]. When we use these proofs to authenticate auxiliary data,
we refer to the resulting non-interactive proofs as signatures of knowledge as defined
in [100].
When referring to these proofs we will use the notation of Camenisch and
Stadler [101]. For instance, NIZKPoK{(x, y) : h = gx ∧ c = gy} denotes a non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the elements x and y that satisfy
both h = gx and c = gy. All values not enclosed in ()’s are assumed to be known to
the verifier. Similarly, the extension ZKSoK[m]{(x, y) : h = gx ∧ c = gy} indicates a
signature of knowledge on message m.
Accumulators [82]. An accumulator allows us to combine many values into one
smaller value (the accumulator). We then have a single element, called the witness,
that allows us to attest to the fact that a given value is actually part of the accumulator.
Our constructions use an accumulator based on the Strong RSA assumption. The
accumulator we use was first proposed by Benaloh and de Mare [102] and later
improved by Baric and Pfitzmann [90] and Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [69]. We
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describe the accumulator using the following algorithms:
• AccumSetup(λ)→ params. On input a security parameter, sample primes p, q
(with polynomial dependence on the security parameter), compute N = pq, and
sample a seed value u ∈ QRN , u ̸= 1. Output (N, u) as params.
• Accumulate(params,C) → A. On input params (N, u) and a set of prime
numbers C = {c1, . . . , ci | c ∈ [A ,B]},11 compute the accumulator A as
uc1c2···cn mod N .
• GenWitness(params, v,C)→ ω. On input params (N, u), a set of prime num-
bers C as described above, and a value v ∈ C, the witness ω is the accumulation
of all the values in C besides v, i.e., ω = Accumulate(params,C \ {v}).
• AccVerify(params,A, v, ω) → {0, 1}. On input params (N, u), an element v,
and witness ω, compute A′ ≡ ωv mod N and output 1 if and only if A′ = A, v
is prime, and v ∈ [A ,B] as defined previously.
For simplicity, the description above uses the full calculation of A. Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya [69] observe that the accumulator may also be incrementally updated,
i.e., given an existing accumulator An it is possible to add an element x and produce
a new accumulator value An+1 by computing An+1 = Axn mod N .12
11“Where A and B can be chosen with arbitrary polynomial dependence on the security parameter,
as long as 2 < A and B < A2." [84] For a full description, see [84, §3.2 and §3.3].
12This allows the network to maintain a running value of the accumulator and prevents individual
nodes from having to recompute it [82].
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Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [69] show that the accumulator satisfies a strong
collision-resistance property if the Strong RSA assumption is hard. Informally, this
ensures that no p.p.t. adversary can produce a pair (v, ω) such that v /∈ C and yet
AccVerify is satisfied. Additionally, they describe an efficient zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge that a committed value is in an accumulator. We convert this into a
non-interactive proof using the Fiat-Shamir transform and refer to the resulting proof
using the following notation:
NIZKPoK{(v, ω) : AccVerify((N, u), A, v, ω) = 1}.
Verifiable Random Functions. A pseudorandom function (PRF) [103] is an effi-
ciently computable function whose output cannot be distinguished (with non-negligible
advantage) from random by a computationally bounded adversary. We denote the
pseudorandom function as fk(·), where k is a randomly chosen key. A number of PRFs
possess efficient proofs that a value is the output of a PRF on a set of related public
parameters. Two examples of this are the Dodis-Yampolskiy (DY) PRF [104] and the
Naor-Reingold PRF [105].
Pedersen Commitments. A commitment scheme allows a user to bind herself to a
chosen value without revealing that value to the recipient of the commitment. This
commitment to the value ensures that the user cannot change her choice (i.e., binding),
while simultaneously ensuring that the recipient of the commitment does not learn
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anything about the value it contains (i.e., hiding) [106]. In Pedersen commitments [107],
the public parameters are a group G of prime order q, and generators (g0, . . . , gm).
In order to commit to the values (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Zmq , pick a random r ∈ Zq and set







4.6 A Concrete Instantiation
We now provide a concrete instantiation of our construction and prove the security
of our construction under the Discrete Logarithm and Strong RSA assumptions.
4.6.1 Overview of the Construction
Alice’s pseudonym with a given organization/user is an arbitrary identity that she
claims in a transaction. She tags this value with a Pedersen commitment to her secret
key sk and signs the resulting transaction using a signature of knowledge that she
knows the secret key. There is no separate process for registering a pseudonym: instead
they are simply used in issue and show to allow operations to be linked if necessary.
Alice’s credential c is a vector Pedersen commitment to both sk and a set of public
attributes attrs = a0, . . . , am, which Alice also includes in her credential. To issue a
credential, Alice provides the network with a credential, a pseudonym, her attributes,
optionally some auxiliary data justifying the credential issue (e.g., a proof of work
that Alice is not a Sybil), and a proof that (1) the commitment and the pseudonym
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contain the same secret key and (2) the attributes are in some allowed set. If all of
this validates, the entry is added to the ledger. Alice shows the credential under a
different pseudonym by proving in zero-knowledge that (1) she knows a credential
on the ledger from the organization, (2) the credential opens to the same sk as her
pseudonym, and (3) it has some attributes.
4.6.2 The Construction
The full construction is provided in Figure 4.2. We use Pedersen commitments and
a Strong RSA based accumulator to instantiate the core of the protocol. The proofs
of knowledge in the Show algorithm are conducted using Schnorr-style proofs modified
using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic as in previous work [94, 69]. The implementation of
the proofs are similar to those used by Miers et al. in [82].
Theorem 4.6.1. The basic distributed anonymous credential system described in
Figure 4.2 is secure in the random oracle model under the Strong RSA and the
Discrete Logarithm assumptions.
We provide a sketch of the proof of Theorem 4.6.1 in Appendix E.
13“Where A and B can be chosen with arbitrary polynomial dependence on the security parameter,
as long as 2 < A and B < A2." [84]. For a full description, see [84, §3.2 and §3.3].
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• Setup(1λ) → params. On input a security parameter λ, run AccumSetup(1λ) to obtain the
values (N, u). Next generate primes p, q such that p = 2wq + 1 for w ≥ 1. Let G be an order-q
subgroup of Z⋆p, and select random generators g0, . . . , gn such that G = ⟨g0⟩ = · · · = ⟨gn⟩. Output
params = (N, u, p, q, g0, . . . , gn).
• KeyGen(params)→ sk . On input a set of parameters params, select and output a random master
secret sk ∈ Zq.
• FormNym(params, sk)→ (Nym , skNym ). Given a user’s master secret sk , select a random r ∈ Zq
and compute Nym = gr0gsk1 . Set skNym = r and output (Nym , skNym ).
• MintCred(params, sk ,NymOU , skNymOU , attrs, aux) → (c, skc, πM ). Given a nym Nym
O
U and its
secret key skNymOU ; attributes attrs = (a0, . . . , am) ∈ Zq; and auxiliary data aux, select a random







gaii+2 such that {c prime | c ∈ [A ,B]}.13 Set skc = r′ and
output (c, skc, πM ) where πM is a signature of knowledge on aux that the nym and the credential
both belong to the same master secret sk , i.e.:















Finally, submit the resulting values (c, πM , attrs,NymOU , aux) to the public transaction ledger.
• MintVerify(params, c, attrs,NymOU , aux, πM ) → {0, 1}. Given a credential c, attributes attrs, a
nym NymOU , and proof πM , verify that πM is the signature of knowledge on aux. If the proof
verifies successfully, output 1, otherwise output 0. The organization nodes should accept the
credential to the ledger if and only if this algorithm returns 1.
• Show(params, sk ,NymVU , skNymVU , c, attrs, skc,CO)→ πS . Given a user’s master secret sk ; a nym
NymVU between the user and the verifier and its secret key skNymVU ; a credential c and its secret
key skc; the attributes (a0, . . . , am) used in the credential; and a set of credentials C, compute
A = Accumulate(params,CO) and ω = GenWitness(params, c,CO) and output the following proof
of knowledge:
πS = NIZKPoK{(sk , ω, r′, c, r,NymVU ) :














• ShowVerify(params,NymVU , πS ,CO) → {0, 1}. Given a nym Nym
V
U , proof of possession of a
credential πS , and the set of credentials issued by organization O CO, first compute A =
Accumulate(params,CO). Then verify that πS is the aforementioned proof of knowledge on
c, CO, and NymVU using the known public values. If the proof verifies successfully, output 1,
otherwise output 0.
Figure 4.2: Our basic decentralized anonymous credential scheme.
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4.7 Extensions
We consider extending the basic system in several ways.
4.7.1 k-show Credentials
Damgård et al. [76] first suggested a credential system where users could only
authenticate once per time period. Camenisch et al. [77] independently proposed a
significantly more efficient construction that allows for up to k authentications per
time period, with the ability to revoke all cloned credentials if a credential was used
beyond this limit. Camenisch et al. suggested that these techniques might be used to
build anonymous subscription services, allowing users to access a resource (such as a
website) within reasonable bounds. We briefly show that these same techniques can
be applied to our basic credential system.
In the system of [77] an authority issues a credential on a user’s secret seed s. To
show a credential for the ith time in validity period t, the user generates a serial number
S using a verifiable random function (VRF) as S = fs(0||t||i). She also includes a
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that this serial number is correctly structured.14
This technique can be applied to our construction provided we can securely store
a seed for the VRF. This is easy: the user simply generates a random seed s and
includes this value in the commitment she stores in the transaction ledger. We note
14The re-use of a credential would result in a repeated serial number, and yet the nature of the
VRF’s output (for an honest user) ensures that attackers cannot link individual shows.
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that for the trivial case of one-time show credentials, we can simply reveal the seed.
For k-show, the user provably evaluates the VRF on the seed plus a secret counter.15
4.7.2 Credentials with Hidden Attributes
In our basic construction of §4.6, users provide a full list of attributes when
requesting and showing credentials. While this is sufficient for many applications,
there exist cases where a user might wish to conceal the attributes requested or shown,
opting instead to prove statements about them, e.g., proving knowledge of a secret
key or proving that an attribute is within a certain range. There are two simple ways
to do this. First, we can simply use multi-message commitments where each message
is an attribute. This increases the size of our zero-knowledge proofs (they are linear in
the number of messages in a commitment) but does not change our schemes. A more
efficient construction is to encode the attributes in one single value and then prove
statements about that committed value rather than reveal it. For example, one could
prove that a given bit corresponding to a certain attribute was set. One could also
use the first x bits for attribute one, the next x bits for attribute two, etc. and use
range proofs [108, 109, 110, 111] to reveal only those attributes we want to display.
15Camenisch et al. [77] describe a further extension that reveals the user’s identity in the event
of a credential double-show. We omit the details here for space reasons but observe that the same
technique can be applied to our construction.
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4.7.3 Stateful Credentials
A stateful anonymous credential system [106] is a variant of an anonymous cre-
dential system where credential attributes encode some state that can be updated by
issuing new credentials. This credential issuance is typically conditioned on the user
showing a previous credential and offering proof that the new credential should be
updated as a function of the original.
Intuitively, we can already have this capability quite easily due to the fact that
our credentials are non-interactively issued. We can make stateful credentials simply
by changing the policy by which we issue credentials: to issue a credential in a new
state s1, we require a user to demonstrate that they had a credential in state s0 and
discard it by revealing its single use serial number.
We construct a “single show” credential c embedding some state state in the
attributes and a serial number S. Users are free to show c as many times as they like
without revealing the serial number. However, to update the state of the credential,
they must author a transaction that shows the original credential and reveals the
serial number S and “mint” a new candidate credential c′ containing the updated
state state′ (hidden inside of a commitment) and a proof that there exists a valid
relationship between the state encoded in c and the new state in c′ (for example, that
the attributes have been incremented).
This requires only minor extensions to our basic scheme composing the existing
secure functionality. In this case we add an Update algorithm that operates similarly
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• Update(params, sk , c, skc,CO, update_relation, state′)→ (c′, sk′c, πu). Given a cre-
dential c and associated secret key sk c, a set of credentials CO, an updated state
state′ = (s′0, . . . , s
′
m) ∈ Zq, and an update relation update_relation, generate
a fresh random serial number S ′ ∈ Zq and random value r′ ∈ Zq to form a







i+3 with the aforementioned restrictions. Com-
pute A = Accumulate(params,CO) and ω = GenWitness(params, c,CO). Output
(c′, sk′c, πu) where sk′c = (S ′, state′, r′) and
πu = NIZKPoK{(sk , ω, c, state, r, c′, S ′, state′, r′) :
AccVerify(params,A, c, ω) = 1
∧ c = gr0gsk1 gS2
m∏
i=0












∧ update_relation(state, state′) = 1}
• UpdateVerify(params, c,CO, πu)→ {0, 1}. Given a stateful credential c, a credential
set CO, and proof πu, output 1 if πu is correct, the proved state transition is a legal
one, and the serial number S was not previously used. Otherwise 0.
Figure 4.3: Extensions for a stateful anonymous credential system.
update_relation(. . .) = 1 denotes that the update encodes some arbitrary
state transition (e.g. ∀i s′i = si + 1).
to MintCred but includes the earlier credential and a proof of its construction. A valid
proof of the existing credential now becomes a condition for the organization accepting
the updated credential into the ledger. We provide a description of this new algorithm
in Figure 4.3.
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4.8 Integrating with Proof-of-work Bulletin
Boards
We provide a basic implementation of our credential scheme as a library and
construct a basic example using Namecoin as the bulletin board. Our prototype
system allows users to prove they have a (fresh) commitment to some attributes in
an issued credential. For our purposes it is sufficient to merely reveal the content of
that commitment (the attributes) in its entirety during a show. However, selectively
disclosable attributes are trivially realizable, see §4.7.2.
4.8.1 Integration
Namecoin integration is straightforward. Namecoin provides a built in mechanism
for storing key–value pairs which, by convention, have a namespace as a prefix. It also
provides a basic functionality to scan the list of existing names. Thus we can scan for
credentials, validate them, and then accumulate them. It is then simply matter of
generating and verifying proofs against that computed accumulator value.
For Alice to obtain a credential, she:
1. Pays a very small fee (currently 0.0064 USD) to purchase some name in the
system’s namespace by registering a public key as the owner of the name. This
corresponds to a transaction looking like:
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2. Prepares a fresh credential with some attributes and any supporting documen-
tation necessary for her identity claim and stores the private portion of the
credential.
3. Updates, using the public key from step 1, her registered name to contain a





Once this update is confirmed, Alice has a fully formed credential.
To show the credential to Bob, Alice:
1. Scans through the list of added names and retrieves all candidate credentials.
2. Checks the supporting documentation for each candidate and puts valid ones in
C.
3. Runs Show with the public parameters, the private portion of her credentials,
and C and sends the result to Bob.
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4. Bob does steps 1 and 2 and computes C himself.
5. Bob runs ShowVerify on Alice’s supplied credential and C to verify it.
Alice has now proved she has a credential to Bob.
What the supporting documentation is and how it is verified is an application
specific problem. For some applications, merely having paid the tiny registration fee
may be sufficient and no verification is necessary. For others, some digital signature
may need to be verified or some assertion about resource management (e.g., a proof
of storage/retrievability) may need to be verified. Without modifications to Name-
coin/Bitcoin, any assertion must be verifiable by all participants.16 We consider one
such application in the next section.
4.8.2 Operating Cost
Namecoin is not free to use as purchasing a name costs a small (less than 0.10
USD as of 12/1/2013) amount of money. This fee is necessary both to prevent mass
name hoarding and to provide an economy to pay the miners who maintain the block
chain. This cost must minimally be paid by users when creating a credential. For
certain applications (e.g., k-anonymous credentials), relying parties must also post
data on the block chain (e.g., double spend tags and serial numbers). This, again,
costs a small fee. As such, there are monetary costs to using such an identity scheme.
16With modifications, identity assertions can be validated as part of the consensus protocol,
abrogating relying parties from validating credential issue and allowing the use of ephemeral supporting
documentation.
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4.8.3 Latency
A third consideration for the limited show credentials is the latency of inserting
items into the block chain. Because completely meaningful proofs of work take time,
some time must elapse in any such system. Namecoin and Bitcoin both aim to
create blocks every 10 minutes. Thus, the naive wait time from a block is about 5
minutes. Propagation delays in the network and transaction volume, however, skew
this distribution. While historical data for Namecoin is not available, for Bitcoin it
takes slightly less than 9 minutes for a transaction to first be confirmed. In practice,
it then takes multiple confirmations to solidify the transaction’s place in the block
chain. Variants of Bitcoin operate with faster confirmation times (e.g., Feathercoin,
which aims to get a block every 2.5 minutes), though it is not yet clear if the more
aggressive of these are entirely stable.
Given these latency constraints, our system, at least built on top of proof of work
based bulletin boards, is not suitable for applications that require fast credential issue
or quick detection of multi-spends across mutually distrusting parties.17 A side effect
of this is that double spend prevention mechanisms for fast transactions need to rely
on detection and punishment (e.g., forfeiture of an escrowed value), not prevention.
17Obviously, parties could cooperate and maintain a faster store of double spend tags, alleviating
this problem.
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Figure 4.4: Library performance as a function of parameter size.
4.8.4 Performance
We now examine the performance of our anonymous credential system. There are
four underlying operations: minting a credential, verifying that the mint is correct,
showing a credential, and verifying that show. Showing and verifying credentials also
entail computing the accumulation of all or all but one of the current credentials.
However, both the accumulator and the witnesses can be computed incrementally as
credentials are added: for each added credential, the nodes must update both the
accumulator and the witness for each credential they intend to show. Because this
cost is both amortized for any individual credential show or verify, it does not come
into play. Hence, we measure the accumulation cost separately and run our other
benchmarks with a precomputed witness and accumulator. We also give measurements
for our performance with different security parameters. See Figure 4.4.
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All experiments were conducted on a 2010 MacPro with 16GB of RAM and two
2.4GHz quad core Xeon E5620 processors running OSX 10.8.3. Experiments were
measured in seconds via wall clock run time and were repeated for 500 iterations.
Because of the speed of accumulating elements, we measure accumulator time in
seconds per 100 accumulations.
The primary performance bottleneck for our library is the complexity of the proof
of knowledge generated during the credential show. Because this double discrete
logarithm proof uses cut-and-choose techniques, we need to perform between 80 and
128 iterations depending on the security parameter. This entails approximately 800-
1000 exponentiations. Luckily, the same cryptographic requirements that force these
iterations also mandate that such computations are independent and hence they can
easily be parallelized. To exploit this, we make use of OpenMP to parallelize proof
generation and verification. As shown in Figure 4.4c, this offers significant performance
benefits.
Unfortunately, OpenSSL, which we use for the computations underpinning our
system, is not fully parallelizable due to the fact that its PRNG is synchronous. The
resulting locks around RNG usage prevent us from effectively parallelizing portions of
our code for showing a credential. It also causes problems when minting a credential.
The resource intensive portion of credential mint is creating commitments and then
testing if they are prime. This requires random numbers both directly for commitment
generation and indirectly for primality testing which uses randomized Miller-Rabin.
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We believe further performance gains could be realized by using a parallelizable RNG
(e.g., Intel’s RDRand instruction).
4.9 Example Application: Distributed Direct
Anonymous Attestation (dDAA)
In the original TPM 1.1b specification [112], attestations are signed by a TPM’s
Attestation Identity Key (AIK). Each TPM device can generate many AIKs, and
prior to use each AIK public key is signed by a trusted third party called a Privacy
CA, creating an AIK certification. The purpose of this awkward mechanism is to
provide a layer of indirection between attestations and the manufacturer-specified
keys programmed into the device, such as the permanent Endorsement Key (EK).
By introducing a third party, it becomes possible to create many identities and thus
remove the risk that a given device could be linked to all of its endorsements.
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [71], replaced the privacy CA with a cryp-
tographically sound group signature scheme. Instead of signing attestations with an
AIK, a TPM signs attestations with a private key for a group signature scheme that
preserves the signer’s anonymity. The TPM obtains the group signing key from a
DAA authority by authenticating non-anonymously to the authority with the AIK.
Because the group signature key is used anonymously, the authority can never link its
use to the AIK key that caused its issue. Unfortunately, the integrity of this process
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depends fundamentally on the integrity of the software running in the DAA authority.
This makes deploying a DAA instance somewhat problematic: each organization is
responsible for deploying and securing this DAA authority, and any compromise of this
server opens the door for credential theft or denial of service. Given the critical role
envisioned for TPM attestations, this may inhibit the deployment of DAA systems.
We propose a new TPM design that retains the privacy advantages of DAA without
the need to run a separate DAA server for each deployment. The advantage of our
approach is that organizations may still maintain separate trust environments for
private assertions by TPM devices but without the need to run a vulnerable separate
server. Our solution requires one modification to the existing TPM infrastructure,
namely that the TPM be updated to include a (non-anonymous) signing key, with
a permission level similar to that of the Endorsement Key (EK). We will refer to
this key as the Endorsement Signing Key, or ESK, and assume that each new TPM
will ship with an Endorsement Signing Key Certificate signed by the manufacturer.18
Given this modification we show how to use our anonymous credential scheme as a
replacement for DAA.
To obtain a credential in the new scheme, the TPM runs the MintCred routine,
securely store the resulting sk and transmitting the resulting credential up to the block
chain along with a signature under the TPM’s Endorsement Signing Key (ESK).19
18The TPM Endorsement Key and Endorsement Key Certificate would be sufficient for this role.
However this key is limited by the specification to performing a decryption-only role, largely for
privacy reasons. Our sole modification is to allow signing with this key, or a second key of a similar
nature.
19In principle this ESK signature can be replaced with an AIK signature with no changes to the
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This signature authenticates the credential as having been generated by a valid TPM.
Once the credential and signature are validated, they can be accumulated by verifiers.
The TPM can later attest to a particular configuration by running a modified version
of Show that ensures πS is a signature of knowledge on the attestation values (i.e., the
program configuration registers (PCRs) and an optional nonce). Running ShowVerify
with the appropriate modifications for checking the signature of knowledge validates
the attestation. We stress that even though the TPM’s ESK (or AIK) is on the ledger
with the issued credential, showing a credential never identifies which issued credential
was used and hence does not identify the ESK (or AIK).
4.10 Related Work
Anonymous credentials. Introduced by Chaum [65] and developed in a line of
subsequent works (e.g., [66, 67, 68]), anonymous credentials allow a user to prove that
she has a credential issued by some organization, without revealing anything about
herself other than that she has the credential. Under standard security definitions,
even if the verifier and credential issuer collude, they cannot determine when the
credential was issued, who it was issued to, or when it was or will be used. A
common construction involves issuing a credential by obtaining a signature from an
organization on a committed value (e.g., using the signature scheme of [69]) then
TPM mechanism, but AIKs will have to be issued by a trusted third party.
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proving in zero-knowledge that one has a signature under the organization’s public
key on that value. The contents of the commitment may be revealed outright or
various properties can proved on the committed values (e.g., Alice can prove she is
over 21 years old). Extensions to this work describe credentials that can only be
shown anonymously a limited number of times [77] or delegated to others [70]. All of
these schemes require issuing organizations to maintain a secret key.
Bitcoin and append-only ledgers. Our construction relies on the existence of
a distributed append-only transaction ledger, a technology that makes up the core
component of the Bitcoin distributed currency: the log of all currency transactions
called the block chain [73]. These ledgers are maintained by an ad hoc group of network
nodes who are free to enter and leave the network (there is no key provisioning necessary
for them to join). A typical transaction ledger consists of a sequence of blocks of data
that are widely replicated among the participating nodes, with each block connected
to the previous block using a hash chain. Nodes compete for the opportunity to add
new blocks of transactions to the ledger by producing a partial hash collision over the
new data and the hash of the last block in the chain. The hash collision serves two
purposes: first, it is a computationally-difficult-to-forge authenticator of the ledger
and second, since finding a partial hash collision involves substantial computational
effort, the peer who finds it is chosen “at random” with a probability proportional
to the rate at which he can compute such partial collisions. As a result, an ad hoc
group of mutually distrusting and potentially dishonest peers can correctly manage
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such a ledger provided that a majority of their computational power is held by honest
parties. Recent experience with Bitcoin and Namecoin provides evidence that this
assumption holds in practice.
Namecoin. Namecoin [79] is a decentralized identity system that uses the same block
chain technology as Bitcoin. Namecoin’s primary purpose is to associate names with
arbitrary data. A user can claim a name provided (1) they pay the price in NMC for
it and (2) it is unclaimed. At that point, an entry is inserted into the block chain
mapping the name to a public key and some arbitrary data. The public key allows the
owner to update the data by signing a new record. The data allows for various uses.
If it is an IP address, then one has a distributed DNS system (such a system, .bit, is
already deployed). On the other hand, if it is a public key, the result is a basic PKI.
The first-come first-served nature of Namecoin seems somewhat anachronistic, however
it replicates in miniature the way normal DNS names are generally assigned, where the
first person to claim the name gets it. Similarly, standard (non–extended validation)
SSL certificates for a domain are typically issued to anyone who can demonstrate
control of a domain (usually via an email to admin@domain).
4.11 Conclusion
In this work we constructed a distributed anonymous credential system and several
extensions. Our constructions are secure in the random oracle model under standard
150
CHAPTER 4. NEW DOMAINS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATIONS
cryptographic assumptions provided there exists a trustworthy global append-only
ledger. To realize such a ledger we propose using the block chain system already in
real world use with the distributed cryptographic currency Bitcoin. Although we are
limited in the class of identity assertions we can certify, we argue that several basic
assertions are of particular use in peer-to-peer systems, as they can be used to mitigate
Sybil attacks, ensure fair resource usage, and protect users’ anonymity while verifying
their computer’s correctness.
Future work. We leave two open problems for future work. First, the proofs in
this work assumed the security of a transaction ledger. We leave a precise formal
model of the ledger, which attacks are allowable, and what bounds may be placed
on their consequence as an open problem. Second, the efficiency of our construction
can be improved. Although all of our algorithms are efficient (in that they do not
scale with the size of the ledger), the need for double-discrete logarithm proofs leads
to somewhat large proof sizes when showing a credential (roughly 50KB for modest
parameters). Our construction may be optimized for certain applications that do not
require the full flexibility of our construction. For example, schemes not requiring
selective disclosure of credentials require about half that proof size. At the same
time, we hope that advances in bilinear accumulators, mercurial commitments, or
lattice based techniques may provide a more efficient construction. We are particularly
hopeful that generic work in verifiable computation [113, 114] will offer drastically
smaller proof sizes without resorting to bespoke proofs and protocols.
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Deploying secure cryptographic protocols has many challenges, and this thesis
discussed various ways to increase the security and deployability of real-world cryp-
tographic systems. We first discussed the benefit of analyzing already deployed
cryptographic protocols by demonstrating weaknesses in the popular RC4 algorithm
and showing how to decrypt user passwords encrypted with RC4 in TLS. We then
explored how to make it easier to develop and deploy secure and efficient cryptographic
systems and take theoretical work to practice by discussing cryptographic automation
and AutoGroup+. We concluded by showing how to build secure real-world systems
as well as work to remove barriers of deployment by detailing our work on building
decentralized anonymous credentials using a blockchain. While these works are of
course not a complete solution to the problem of securing deployed cryptographic
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Appendix A
Double-byte biases in the RC4
keystream distribution
As mentioned in Section 2.2, we estimated the initial double-byte keystream
distributions for RC4 in the first 512 positions using roughly 4800 core-days of
computation to generate 244 RC4 keystreams for random 128-bit RC4 keys (as used
in TLS). As noted there, while the gross behaviour that we observed is dominated
by products of the known single-byte biases in the first 256 positions and by the
Fluhrer-McGrew biases in the later positions, we did observe some new and interesting
double-byte biases.
In Figure A.1, for instance, the influence of the single-byte key-length-dependent
bias [115], and the single-byte r-bias [22] are evident. The former can be observed
as the strong vertical line at Z16 = 0xEO, while the latter can be seen as the lines at
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Figure A.1: Measured biases for RC4 keystream byte pair (Z16, Z17). The colouring
scheme encodes the strength of the bias, i.e., the deviation from the expected probability
of 1/216, scaled by a factor of 222, capped at a maximum of 1.
Z16 = 0x10 and Z17 = 0x11. The faint diagonal line appears to be a new double-byte
bias (that is not accounted for as a product of single-byte biases). It appears in
many early positions. For example, it is at least twice as strong as that arising in
the product distribution for at least 64 of the 256 possible byte values from positions
(Z3, Z4) up to positions (Z110, Z111). It then gradually disappears, but reappears at
around positions (Z192, Z193) (albeit as a positive bias) and persists up to positions
(Z257, Z258) (changing sign again at (Z255, Z256)).
The presence of horizontal and vertical lines in Figure A.1 and the absence of
other strong biases, which is typical for the early positions, indicates that the adjacent
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Figure A.2: Measured biases for RC4 keystream byte pair (Z384, Z385). The colouring
scheme encodes the strength of the bias, i.e., the deviation from the expected probability
of 1/216, scaled by a factor of 224, capped at a maximum of 1.
bytes behave largely independently of each other. In other words, there are very
few strong conditional biases in the first 256 positions of the RC4 keystream. For
later positions in the keystream, Figure A.2 depicts what is typical in terms of bias
behaviour: the presence of Fluhrer-McGrew biases only. These are visible in Figure
A.2 at (Z384, Z385)= (0x00, 0x01) and (0x81, 0xFF) for example.
Finally, of particular interest is the distribution of (Z1, Z2). Figure A.3a shows
the raw distribution for this position pair, while Figure A.3b shows the residual
biases when the product distribution of Z1 and Z2 is removed. Note that the raw
distribution is predominately negatively biased; this is because of the effect of the
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(a) Colouring scheme encodes the strength of









































(b) Colouring scheme encodes the strength of
the bias after the product of single-byte biases
for positions Z1 and Z2 is removed, scaled by
a factor of 222, capped at a maximum of 1.
Figure A.3: Measured biases for RC4 keystream byte pair (Z1, Z2).
large Mantin-Shamir positive bias towards 0x00 in position Z2, and the compensating
negative single byte biases for all other values of Z2. Note also the two diagonal lines
in Figure A.3b. The “positive” (blue-coloured) diagonal here represents a negative
bias in (Z1, Z2) for all byte pairs (z, z) where z ∈ B \ {0x00}; this bias is also evident
in the raw distribution in Figure A.3a. The “negative diagonal” in Figure A.3b shows
that there is a systematic difference between the raw double-byte distribution and the
product distribution. It manifests itself as a white-coloured negative diagonal in the
raw double-byte distribution shown in Figure A.3a; thus, in the raw distribution, it
forms a structured set of unbiased pairs against a largely negatively-biased background.
The only other previously known bias of this nature in this portion of the keystream
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is due to Isobe et al. [23], who showed that:
Pr(Z1 = 0x00 ∧ Z2 = 0x00) = 2−16 · (1 + 20.996).
This bias is also evident in Figure A.3. By contrast, the new diagonal biases are
negative, sporting magnitudes in the region of 2−22. For example, we empirically
observe:
Pr(Z1 = 0x14 ∧ Z2 = 0x14) = 2−16 · (1− 2−6.097).
Let us now formally define a large double-byte bias to be one whose magnitude
is at least 2−24. We observed 103,031 such large biases in total. Note that with 244
keystreams, all such biases are statistically significant and highly unlikely to arise from
random fluctuations in our empirical analysis. For, in each position pair (r, r + 1) we
have 216 counters, one for each possible pair (Zr, Zr+1), so, in the absence of any biases,
each counter would be (roughly) normally distributed with mean 244 · 2−16 = 228 and
standard deviation σ of approximately
√
228 = 214. Then a bias of size 2−24 would
lead to a counter value of around
244(2−16 + 2−24) = 228 + 26 · 214
which is a 64σ event. Using the standard tail bound for the normal distribution,
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even with 225 counters in total (across 512 positions), we would expect to see only
218 · e−2048/π ≪ 1 such events.
We found that 643 (less than 1%) of the large biases that we observed were at least
twice the size (in absolute value) of biases resulting from the products of single-byte
biases or of the expected Fluhrer-McGrew bias in the same positions. In other words,
most of the large biases that we observed arise from the product distribution or are
explained by Fluhrer and McGrew’s results. We also note that we did find double-byte
biases in all the positions predicted by Fluhrer and McGrew [25] starting from byte
pair (Z4, Z5) onwards. This is not surprising given that the idealized assumption
concerning the internal state of the RC4 algorithm that was used in the analysis of [25]
is well approximated after a few invocations of the RC4 keystream generator. However,
in many such cases, the magnitude of the bias we observed is greater than is predicted
by the Fluhrer-McGrew analysis. For example, in byte pair (Z6, Z7) we observed
Pr(Z6 = 0x07 ∧ Z7 = 0xFF) = 2−16 · (1− 2−6.487),
whereas the corresponding specified Fluhrer-McGrew probability for this byte pair,
namely the (i+1, 0xFF) byte pair where i is the internal variable of the RC4 keystream
generator, is 216(1 + 2−8).
We do, however, note a transition to the regular Fluhrer-McGrew double-byte
biases from position 257 onwards. We also note the disappearance of the single-byte
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biases from roughly this point onwards. This is illustrated in Figure A.4, which shows

















Details of IMAP Proof of Concept
In this section we describe the proof-of-concept implementation of our attacks
against IMAP in more detail.
B.1 Introducing IMAP
The Internet Message Access Protocol, currently at version 4: revision 1 (IMAP4rev1),
facilitates the retrieval and manipulation of e-mail messages stored on a server. We
provide a brief description of the protocol, focusing only on the client/server commands
and responses that are relevant to this work. Further details can be found in [116].
An IMAP session commences with the establishment of a client/server connection,
followed by an initial greeting message from the server and the subsequent exchange
of messages between the client and the server. All IMAP messages are text-based
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with client messages taking the form of commands and server messages typically
taking the form of responses. Client commands cover a broad spectrum of functions
including the creation, searching and deletion of e-mails but of interest here are the
AUTHENTICATE and LOGIN commands. These commands are only valid when an IMAP
server is in what is known as the not authenticated state. This state is entered into
when a client/server connection is established, and the client must supply legitimate
authentication credentials so as to enable the server to move to the authenticated state.
The AUTHENTICATE command specifies an authentication mechanism to be used by
the server to identify and authenticate the user. The various mechanisms available
are specified in [117, 118, 119]. We will target the PLAIN Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL) mechanism [118]. The arguments for this mechanism include an
authorization identity string, a username and a password. The authorization identity
string is a sequence of zero or more Unicode characters that represent the identity
the client wishes to assume. It is possible for the authorization identity string to be
empty, in which case, the server will derive an authorization identity from the other
credentials provided. As with BasicAuth, the authorization credentials are not directly
protected by IMAP.
The format of the AUTHENTICATE command is specified in [116] and involves the
transmission of username and password in Base64 encoded form, with these fields being
separated by a NULL character. The LOGIN command identifies and authenticates a
user to the server by providing a username and a password. The command has the
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following format:
A001 LOGIN "username" "password".
These credentials are again transmitted in the clear. We note that the IMAP specifi-
cation [116] recommends that the AUTHENTICATE PLAIN and LOGIN commands only
be used when a secure channel is available, such as provided by TLS. In fact, the
LOGIN command is recommended as a last resort only. The establishment of a TLS
session is achieved by the STARTTLS command. Once a client issues this command, it
must wait for the server to acknowledge this request and the subsequent completion
of the TLS negotiation before issuing any further commands. Also, the client must
discard any information about server capabilities received prior to the issuance of
the STARTTLS command. This is to protect against Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attacks which alter the capability list prior to the establishment of the TLS ses-
sion. According to [116], “IMAP client and server implementations MUST implement
the TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 cipher suite, and SHOULD implement the
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite." The use of RC4 in
IMAP can therefore be expected to be prevalent.
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B.2 Attacking IMAP
As with BasicAuth, we require the password to be located sufficiently early in the
plaintext streams of IMAP connections, and we need to find a means of forcing an
IMAP to repeatedly send the AUTHENTICATE or LOGIN commands.
We have verified the former condition to hold for specific clients such as Mozilla
Thunderbird. For example, with that client, we saw the password vary between
positions 102 and 128 for AUTHENTICATE, depending on the server that the client
connected to; however this number was consistent on a per server basis. We speculate
that this is because of different server configurations or presented client capabilities.
Moreover, clients are typically configured to connect to the server and check for new
mail on a regular basis, typically every 10 minutes, but often much more frequently.
We built a proof-of-concept demonstration of an attack on IMAP, with the setup
being as follows. A client machine ran Mozilla Thunderbird, set to check for new
mail every 10 minutes. The client can be setup to either connect to the IMAP server
via STARTTLS on port 143 or IMAPS on port 993. The latter is an alternative means
of establishing a TLS connection for IMAP data transfers. The server was running
the Dovecot1 open source IMAP email server, configured with TLS and set to prefer
RC4 ciphersuites. The MITM was set up between the client and the server. All three
(client, server, MITM) were separate physical machines, though they all resided on
the same network. We again used Scapy to do all the packet handling at the MITM.
1http://www.dovecot.org/
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The MITM capability was achieved by configuring the Thunderbird client to connect
directly to the MITM machine, which then forwarded all traffic through to the IMAP
server (via an iptables rule). The MITM then also has the ability to delay or block
packets, though it did not exercise that capability for the most part in our attack.
This way of configuring our network replaced the ARP spoofing step used in our
BasicAuth attack.
The attack then proceeded as follows. The client and server were allowed to
establish a TLS-protected IMAP connection. After the password was sent (an event
that we can identify because of the rigid format of IMAP messages), the MITM issued
TCP RST messages terminating the connection. The next time the client tries to poll
the server, it is forced to redo the TCP handshake and the TLS handshake, thus
opening a new session and allowing the MITM to collect another encryption of the
password (since every time the client opens a new connection to the server, it must
reauthenticate).
In our proof-of-concept, we successfully executed all of the above steps and collected
encrypted passwords. However, the rate at which the encrypted passwords could be
gathered was slow, because of its dependence on the frequency with which the IMAP
client polls the server for new mail. There are several different ways in which the rate
can be increased in practice:
• Many mail clients (though not Thunderbird) actively reconnect and perform
client authentication whenever the TLS connection between client and server is
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broken. An active MITM attacker could then simply break the TLS connection
between client and server at as high a speed as the client and server can handle,
thereby increasing the rate at which encrypted passwords are sent.
• The widely implemented IMAP IDLE command [120] enables a server to notify
a client that an event has occurred on the server of relevance to the user, for
example that new mail has arrived at the server. It works by the client regularly
sending an IDLE command to the server, and the server responding with alerts
concerning new messages.2 When used, the rate of IDLE commands can be
expected to be every few seconds to a minute (so that the user has the illusion
of receiving instant updates). Each IDLE command can be expected to be sent
on a fresh TLS connection and involve client authentication.
• An alternative mechanism, widely used on cell phones, are PUSH notifications.
Here, the user is notified directly by the server when new mail arrives (or another
event of significance occurs), rather than in response to a poll. By sending a
large amount of spam e-mail to an account at a constant rate, and having the
MITM break the TLS connection at a similar rate, an attacker could ensure that
the client connects to the server at that rate, with each connection involving
reauthentication and therefore retransmission of the user password. Of course,
it is unreasonable to send 224 e-mails to a single account in order to mount
our attack. However, note that for a PUSH system to be effective, the PUSH
2See http://www.isode.com/whitepapers/imap-idle.html for a good overview.
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notifications would need to be capable of being sent over an unprotected channel
(since such a channel may not be in place when the notification needs to be
sent). This makes them spoofable by an active MITM, which may be exploited
as a means to trigger the establishment of the required TLS connections.
The detailed exploration of these different methods for speeding up our proof of
concept against IMAP is left for future work.
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Current Efficiency Numbers for
Type-I and Type-III Pairings
Size (in bits) Exp. Time (in milliseconds)
Sym. vs. Asym. Setting G1 G2 GT G1 G2 GT Pairing Time
SS1536 (or Type-I) 1536 1536 3072 5.3 ms 5.3 ms 1.0 ms 14.9 ms
BN256 (or Type-III) 256 1024 3072 0.2 ms 1.2 ms 2.1 ms 2.2 ms
Figure C.1: Comparing Size and Efficiency of Pairing-based Curves.
We include current efficiency numbers for Type-I and Type-III groups as imple-
mented in the highly efficient RELIC cryptographic toolkit version 0.4 [62] (using the
GMP library [121] for big number operations and the default configuration options
for prime field arithmetic) measured on a standard workstation.1 In Figure C.1, we
show the differences between Type-I and Type-III pairings at the same security level
in terms of group representation and efficiency. 2 A typical candidate for Type-I
12.4 GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 8GB of RAM (1067 MHz DDR3) running Mac OS X Lion
version 10.7.5
2A careful reader may observe that the exponentiation time for GT in SS1536 appears surprisingly
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are supersingular elliptic curves (or SS) [122, 123] in which the embedding degree is
typically small (i.e., k ≤ 6). One such example is a supersingular curve at the 128-bit
security level where the prime order of the group is large, |p|= 1536-bits, and the
embedding degree is k = 2. Conversely, one common Type-III candidate at the same
security level are Barreto-Naehrig (BN) [124] curves in which the embedding degree is
much larger (e.g., k = 12) and the prime order can be as small as |p|= 256-bits. As
reflected in Table C.1, group operations and pairing times in the Type-III setting can
be drastically more efficient and have shorter representations than the Type-I setting.
We remark on hashing into Type-I and Type-III pairing groups. In the Type-I
setting, it is feasible to hash arbitrary strings into G, e.g., for the SS curve, hashing
arbitrary strings to G takes on average 36.8 ms. In the Type-III setting (e.g., over
ordinary elliptic curves), it is feasible to hash arbitrary strings into both G1 and G2
independently with different costs, e.g., for the BN curve, hashing to G1 takes 0.04
ms and to G2 takes 0.37 ms on average (a ratio of roughly 9 to 1 from G2 to G1).
See [125] for more details.
small. We reassure the reader that this is not a typo. With the SS1536, GT = Fp2 is a lower extension
of a larger field, whereas with BN256, GT = Fp12, which is a higher extension of a smaller field. Thus,
even though the elliptic curve points are larger with SS1536, the field multiplication operation in GT
is quite efficient. This does not apply to G1,G2 as those are doing scalar multiplication.
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SDL Descriptions for Section 3.4
We now provide examples of the input and output Scheme Description Language
(SDL) for AutoGroup+.
D.1 SDL as Input























assumpKey := expand{g, a, b, c, z}
A := g ^ a
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B := g ^ b
C := g ^ c
coinflip := random(bin)
BEGIN :: if
if { coinflip == 0 }
Z := e(g, g) ^ (a * b * c)
else
Z := e(g, g) ^ z
END :: if
assumpVar := list{g, A, B, C, Z}
output := assumpVar
END :: func:assump


















g2alpha := g2 ^ alpha
msk := list{g2alpha}
pk := list{g, g1, g2, h1, h2}
output := list{msk, pk}
END :: func:setup
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BEGIN :: func:keygen
input := list{pk, msk, ID1, ID2}




d1 := g2alpha * \
(((g1^ID1)*h1)^r1) * (((g1^ID2)*h2)^r2)
d2 := g ^ r1
d3 := g ^ r2




input := list{pk, M, ID1, ID2}
pk := expand{g, g1, g2, h1, h2}
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s := random(ZR)
C1 := (e(g1,g2)^s) * M
C2 := g ^ s
C3 := ((g1^ID1) * h1)^s
C4 := ((g1^ID2) * h2)^s




input := list{pk, sk, ct}
pk := expand{g, g1, g2, h1, h2}
ct := expand{C1, C2, C3, C4}
sk := expand{d1, d2, d3}
M := C1*((e(C3,d2) * e(C4,d3))/(e(C2,d1)))
output := M
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END :: func:decrypt

































if { coinflip == 0 }
Z := e(g, g)^(a * b * c)
else
Z := e(g, g)^z
END :: if
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for{i := 1, l}
alphai#i := random(ZR)
h#i := (g1^-IDstar#i) * (g^alphai#i)
END :: for
pk := list{g, g1, g2, h}
assumpVar := list{A, B, C, Z}
reductionParams := list{g3, alphai, IDstar}
output := list{msk, pk, reductionParams, assumpVar}
END :: func:setup
BEGIN :: func:queries
input := list{j, pk, ID, reductionParams}
pk := expand{g, g1, g2, h}
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reductionParams := expand{g3, alphai, IDstar}
BEGIN :: for





for{v := 1, j}
dotProd1 := dotProd1 * (((g1^(ID#v - IDstar#v)) * \
(g^alphai#v))^r#v)
END :: for
d1 := (g2^((-alphai#j) / (ID#j - IDstar#j))) * dotProd1
BEGIN :: for
for{i := 1, j}
BEGIN :: if
if {i == j }
di#j := (g2^(-1/(ID#j - IDstar#j))) * (g^r#j)
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input := list{M, ID, reductionParams, assumpVar}
pk := expand{g, g1, g2, h}
assumpVar := expand{A, B, C, Z}
reductionParams := expand{g3, alphai, IDstar}
b := random(bin)
C1 := M#b * Z
C2 := g3
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BEGIN :: for
for{i := 1, k}
Ci#k := g3 ^ alphai#i
END :: for
ct := list{C1, C2, Ci}
output := ct
END :: func:challenge
We provide the configuration file that embeds the metadata required by Auto-














D.2 Translated Scheme and Assumption SDL
Descriptions





































if {coinflip == 0}




assumpVar := list{gG1, gG2, A,\
BG1, BG2, CG1, CG2, Z}
output := assumpVar
END :: func:assump
The second SDL output is the asymmetric BB HIBE scheme [57] that optimally

























pk := list{gG1, gG2, g1, g2G1, g2G2, h1G1, h2G1}
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output := list{msk, pk}
END :: func:setup
BEGIN :: func:keygen
input := list{pk, msk, ID1, ID2}




d1 := ((g2alpha * \
(((g1^ID1) * h1G1)^r1)) * (((g1^ID2) * h2G1)^r2))
d2 := (gG2^r1)
d3 := (gG2^r2)
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input := list{pk, M, ID1, ID2}
pk := expand{gG1, gG2, g1, g2G1, g2G2, h1G1, h2G1}
s := random(ZR)
C1 := ((e(g1,g2G2)^s) * M)
C2 := (gG2^s)
C3 := (((g1^ID1) * h1G1)^s)
C4 := (((g1^ID2) * h2G1)^s)




input := list{pk, sk, ct}
pk := expand{gG1, gG2, g1, g2G1, g2G2, h1G1, h2G1}
ct := expand{C1, C2, C3, C4}
sk := expand{d1, d2, d3}
M := (C1*((e(C3,d2) * e(C4,d3))/e(d1,C2)))
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Proof Sketch of Security for Our
Basic System
We now provide a sketch of the proof of security for our basic distributed anonymous
credentials system.
Our basic approach is to show that for every real-world adversary A against the
credential system, we can construct an ideal-world adversary S against the ideal-world
system such that the transcript of A interacting with the real system is computationally
indistinguishable from the transcript produced by A interacting with S. We assume a
static corruption model in which the adversary controls some set of users and leave
a proof in the adaptive corruption model for future work. For this sketch we also
assume that our zero-knowledge signatures of knowledge include an efficient extractor
and simulator and that the params are created using a trusted setup process. Note
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that in the random oracle model this assumption holds for the Fiat-Shamir proofs we
employ, provided we conduct the proofs sequentially.
Our proof assumes the existence of a global, trusted transaction ledger, which we
use as a black box. We leave a complete proof that considers this construction and
models it to future work.
We begin by sketching the simulator S for our system.
E.1 Description of the Simulator
Minting a credential. When a user controlled by the adversary with nym NymOU
wants a credential, the user first generates (c, πM , attrs). When the simulator receives
notification of this, it first verifies that the credential and proof are valid and meet
the organization’s policy. If so it employs the knowledge extractor for the signature of
knowledge on πM to obtain (sk , aux).
The simulator then checks if it has a record of (U , sk ,NymOU ) on its list of users.
If the user with key sk and nym NymOU exists, then S retrieves skU associated with
(U , sk ,NymOU ) and proceeds. If it is not on the list, the simulator checks if it has
previously seen a user with key sk . If the user with key sk is not present, then the
simulator creates a user U and runs RegNym(NymOU ,U , O) to register NymOU and
obtain skU for further interactions with TP . S then stores (U , sk , skU ,NymOU ) in its
list of users controlled by the adversary. If a user U with key sk exists, then it runs
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RegNym(NymOU ,U , O) to register NymOU and adds NymOU to U ’s record.
Once the simulator has registered the nym or verified it already exists, it runs
MintCred(NymOU , O, attrs, aux). The simulator then transmits the credential infor-
mation to the trusted store and acknowledges the credential’s issuance. S stores
(sk ,NymOU , attrs, aux, c, πM) in its list of granted credentials.
When an honest user, through TP , wants to establish a credential, the simulator
creates a credential c (using the publicly available attrs) and uses the simulator for
the signature of knowledge πM to simulate the associated proof. It then transmits the
credential information (c, πM , attrs) to the trusted store.
Showing a credential. When a user controlled by the adversary wants to show a
credential from organization O to verifier V with which it has nyms NymOU and Nym
V
U
respectively, the user first generates πS. When the simulator receives notification of
this, it verifies the proof as in the real protocol (rejecting if it is invalid). If the show
verifies, it runs the knowledge extractor for the proof of knowledge on πS to get sk .
The simulator then checks if it has a record of (U , sk ,NymOU ,NymVU ) on its list of
users. If the user with key sk and nyms NymOU and Nym
V
U exists, then S retrieves
skU associated with (U , sk ,NymOU ) and proceeds. If the record does not exist, either
in part or in full, the simulator checks if it has previously seen a user with key sk .
If the user with key sk is not present, then the simulator creates a user U and runs
RegNym(NymOU ,U , O) and RegNym(NymVU ,U , V ) to register NymOU and NymVU and
obtain skU for further interactions with TP . S then stores (U , sk , skU ,NymOU ,NymVU )
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in its list of users controlled by the adversary. If a user U with key sk exists, then
it runs RegNym(NymOU ,U , O) (resp. RegNym(NymVU ,U , V )) to register NymOU (resp.




U ) to U ’s record.
Now, the simulator S runs ShowOnNym(NymOU ,NymVU , O, V,C) where C is ob-
tained by the simulator through a call to GetCredList(O).
When an honest user (through TP ) wants to show a credential to a verifier V
controlled by the adversary, the simulator generates a random prime commitment and
runs the zero-knowledge simulator for πS to simulate a proof that it then sends to V .
E.1.1 Proof (sketch) of a Successful Simulation
Our simulation is computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol if the
Strong RSA and the Discrete Logarithm assumptions hold. While we do not provide
a full proof here due to space reasons, we provide an overview of the argument for
security.
We first begin by discussing the signatures/proofs πM and πS. Under the Discrete
Logarithm assumption, πM is a computational zero-knowledge signature of knowledge
on aux of the values sk , r, and r′ such that the nym NymOU and the credential c
both belong to the same master secret sk . The proof is constructed using standard
techniques in the random oracle model [94], and the resulting proofs are (at least)
computationally zero knowledge. An attacker who forges this proof to spend a new
coin would violate the soundness guarantee of the proof system. Alternatively, an
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attacker might forge this message by identifying a collision on the commitments, which
occurs with negligible probability under the Discrete Logarithm assumption [107]. In
the event that this occurs, we can use the extractor for the zero knowledge proof to
obtain the collision with all but negligible probability.
Under the Strong RSA and Discrete Logarithm assumptions, πS is a statistical
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the values sk , ω, c, NymVU , r,
and r′ such that ω is a witness that c is in the accumulator A and nym NymVU and the
credential c both belong to the same master secret sk . This proof is again constructed
using standard techniques [94, 69] similar to the proofs used by Miers et al. in [82]. In
order to forge such a proof, the adversary would need to either find a collision on the
commitments or forge an accumulator membership proof. We previously discussed
how the first case occurs with negligible probability. The second case occurs with
negligible probability under the Strong RSA assumption due to [69]. See the full
version of the paper for a formal treatment/reduction of these statements.
Intuitively, we can now see that the simulator will fail with at most negligible
probability because it deals solely with zero-knowledge signatures of knowledge and
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, which have efficient extractors and simulators.
Our proofs πM and πS have knowledge extractors that succeed with probability 1−ν(λ)
for some negligible function ν(·). Since signatures and proofs are the sole point of
failure for our simulator described above, it fails with negligible probability. Because
the adversary only sees the simulated zero-knowledge proofs and signatures, and the
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simulated signatures and proofs are computationally indistinguishable from legitimate
ones, the adversary cannot distinguish a simulated transcript from the real protocol
except with negligible advantage. Hence the adversary cannot distinguish between an
interaction with the simulator and the real protocol.
We note that the Pedersen commitments we use are non-standard in that we
output only commitments that are prime. We stress that these commitments remain
information theoretically hiding and computationally binding under the assumption
that the Discrete Logarithm assumption holds in ⟨g⟩.
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